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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to identify if there is a need for combatives training in the 
United States Navy. Historically, there would not be a need for a Navy Self-Defense 
Program. However, the operating environment has changed. The mission of the Navy is 
changing. The battlefield, which has typically been largely a one-dimensional front led by 
the United States Army, requires a more dynamic, all-encompassing approach. Emerging 
oppositions, and increased military commitments on a global scale, expanded the roles of 
all service members. The most dramatic change is to the Navy Sailor. Servicemen, in 
particular Sailors, are being assigned to non-traditional tasks. Ten years ago, this was not 
the case. However, with 9/11, the Navy’s role has changed. The Navy has historically 
lacked in this type of training. Currently, limited training in self-defense is provided. The 
Navy has no proactive plan for the future.  Hand-to-hand combat training for the Navy is 
completely overlooked. The Army Modern Combatives Program (MAC) and Marine 
Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) were developed out of the need for a 
standardized system to train and develop warriors. The Air Force Combative Program 
(AFCP) was born from the MAC mold, recognizing a need to enhance fighting 
capabilities. On an international level, Israel and Russia developed programs for similar 
reasons. MCMAP is the recommended program to introduce combatives to the U.S. 
Navy. From there, the U.S. Navy can develop a program that is tailored to the different 
job specialties available. Core facilities are available in key Navy ports throughout the 
world that can provide a training ground for Navy combatives. From a cost-benefit look 
at combatives, this thesis argues that the benefits outweigh the costs. Injuries will occur 
in combatives, but the benefits to teaching combatives outweigh these costs. Providing a 
self-defense program helps develop and enhance the overall skills of a Sailor. 
Additionally, self-defense training might help a Sailor recognize weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities. Most importantly, combatives enhances the qualities of the Navy Core 
Values in every Sailor.   
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I. HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT:  BUILDING THE COMPLETE 
SAILOR  
Close combat is the oldest form of combat known to man. As man 
progressed, so did his methods of combat. But no matter how technical or 
scientific warfare becomes, there will always be close combat. When 
modern weapons fail to sop the opponent, man must rely on their close 
combat skills.  
— United States Marine Corps, Close Combat Manual  
 
A. UNARMED COMBAT:  NOT JUST FOR THE ARMY 
The United States military has evolved from pre-9/11. Historically, the U.S. has 
depended on the Army to take the brunt of land combat operations. The U.S. Marine 
Corps was tasked with amphibious operations, while the Air Force and Navy supplied the 
air and naval power. The primary duties of each branch remained largely intact. 
However, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan remind the U.S. military that the concept of 
joint operations must be embraced by each service. The four service branches of the U.S. 
military are less individual entities in warfare. Each service is relied upon to work 
together to share the brunt of combat operations.    
With the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army does not possess 
the manpower to operate in both areas on its own. The Air Force and Navy provide 
augmentation personnel to assist the Army in the war effort. This augmentation has put 
both Air Force and Navy personnel in harm’s way. Specifically, individual augmentation 
places Air Force and Navy personnel in the position to possibly engage in close combat 
with the enemy. Before 9/11, the Navy and Air Force were not typically tasked with this 
assignment. This is an example of crossing over, and a stronger example of the changing 
landscape that defines the future of U.S. military operations. To counter this tasking, the 
U.S. Air Force focused on programs to train its personnel in ground fighting skills. In 
particular, the Air Force established a program to develop the Airman’s skills in hand-to-
hand combat fighting. The Air Force uses a mixture of reactive and proactive thinking to 
help better prepare its Airmen for the future, while the U.S. Navy remains deficient.                    
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With the ever-changing landscape of warfare, and the increased focus on joint 
operations, it is necessary for the Navy to recognize its deficiency in the arena of hand-to-
hand combat. Currently, the U.S. Navy is void of a standardized combatives program. Of 
the four military services that make up the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy is the 
sole service without a standardized program. This thesis focuses on the need for the 
United States Navy to create a self-defense program. Using the successful development 
and implementation of the United States Army Modern Army Combatives (MAC) 
Program, the developing Air Force Combatives Program (AFCP), and the Marine Corps 
Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) as templates, with international military combative 
programs as additional examples, this thesis analyzes the success of standardized military 
self-defense programs. Additionally, this thesis briefly details the efforts of non-state 
actors and their attempts to kill or kidnap servicemen during the wars of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Through all this evidence, we can paint a clear picture as to why the Navy 
needs a self-defense program.      
In conclusion, the United States Navy needs a standardized self-defense program 
to provide Sailors the tools necessary to defend themselves in a hostile situation. As a 
positive side effect, this program will enhance each Sailor’s development of the core 
values of honor, courage and commitment. As Admiral Roughead explains in his Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) guidance for 2010,  
We have over 50,000 Sailors stationed around the world. 13,000 of these 
Sailors are on the ground. One key tasking of the US Navy is augmenting 
ground forces to the war-fighting effort. In addition, Navy SEAL and 
EOD teams are still utilized in direct action, frontline situations.  
One question that requires an answer from the CNO’s guidance is:  What are we 
doing to prepare our Sailors for increased ground combat? 
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: Does the U.S. Navy need a 
standardized self-defense program?  Also, if a standardized program is developed, what 
should it look like?  These are topics of debate in the Navy. Certainly, on an historical 
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level, and when compared to other military branches, the need for s to defend themselves 
in hand-to-hand combat was minimal. This must be a point of consideration when making 
an argument in favor a standardized program. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars created a 
new era of combat that requires the total focus of a combined military front, i.e., joint 
operations. As the U.S. military enters a new era of increased joint operations, we need to 
address how this affects the soldier, Sailor, or airman on the battlefield.    
The scope of this thesis is focused on the U.S. military and several international 
military forces with established combatives programs. Presumably, there is a need for 
self-defense training inside the military. Within the U.S., the Army, Marine Corps, and 
Air Force embraced the need for a standardized program. There is little argument that at 
the elite combat level of the military, units that see the brunt of direct action certainly 
should dedicate training time in the development of hand-to-hand to combat.  In regards 
to the U.S. Navy, the elite SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) and EOD (Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal) teams, bear the U.S. Navy load of frontline combat in the joint operations 
mission. Questions that need to be answered are: at what level, at what complexity, and 
more important, which units in the U.S. Navy should receive training?  Additionally, an 
examination needs to be made in regards to the effects a self-defense program has to the 
fighting spirit. How does a self-defense program help morale and character development?  
Presently, these questions have not been answered. This thesis attempts to provide 
answers that substantially answer the thesis question.    
C. BACKGROUND 
Historically, there was negligible need for a standardized U.S. Navy Self-defense 
Program. However, the operating environment has changed. The mission of the Navy is 
changing.  The battlefield, which has typically been largely a front led by the United 
States Army, is more dynamic, requiring an all-encompassing approach.   Emerging 
oppositions and increased military commitments on a global scale expanded the roles of 
all service members.  The most dramatic change is to the Navy Sailor. Servicemen, in 
particular, Sailors, are being assigned to nontraditional tasks. No longer are Sailors solely 
charged with duties aboard warships. Multiple wars placed both Navy SEALS and EOD 
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teams in the forefront of direct combat operations. Military augmentation plans tasked 
fleet Sailors on assignment to combat zones. Additionally, along with these duties, the 
United States Navy still requires Sailors to stand watch aboard warships, as well as 
maintain roving base security and shore patrol. These tasks all require the ability of a 
Sailor to defend from oppositions.    
Currently, standardized training in self-defense is not provided for the United 
States Navy. The Navy has traditionally overlooked combatives type training. Even our 
current SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) and EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams, who 
share the brunt of frontline operations, do not receive adequate training. Additionally, the 
Navy has no proactive plans for the future in establishing a standardized program.   
This thesis starts to answer the Navy self-defense question by analyzing the 
United States Marine Corp, Army and Air Force combatives programs, in particular, why 
each program was developed and standardized for its respective military branches. The 
second critical research addresses the foreign combatives systems of Russia and Israel. 
The intent of this critical research is to explore the reason each program was developed, 
and how it can relate to U.S. Navy’s combatives needs. A third critical research area 
explores the non-state actor side of combatives with a look at their combatives training. 
In particular, the third critical research focuses on Al Qaeda and other 21st century 
terrorist organizations. The final critical research discusses the current employment of the 
Navy throughout the globe. Through successful combatives programs already in place 
throughout the world, we can use these examples to conclude why the U.S. Navy needs a 
self-defense program.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the amplified focus of joint operations and the increased intensification of 
U.S. Navy Sailors assigned to the battlefield, does the United States Navy need a 
standardized self-defense program? 
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E. HYPOTHESIS 
A standardized U.S. Navy Self-defense Program is a necessary addition to the 
fleet training curriculum that provides a Sailor a critical tool to survive in a hostile 
situation. Additionally, the Navy Self-defense Program increases the overall physical 
fitness of a Sailor, and develops the core value elements of honor, courage and 
commitment. Areas such as: discipline, awareness and self confidence increases with 
consistent self-defense development. A standardized Navy Self-Defense Program is 
designed in such a way to evolve: as enemy tactics and techniques evolve, the Navy self-
defense program will also evolve. Navy self-defense Instructors, students, and battlefield 
veterans will provide input to improve the program.  
In the area of cost benefit, the Navy Self-Defense Program has some risks. In 
particular, the cost takes place in the area of combative related injuries. Injuries will 
occur. In hand-to-hand training, it is inevitable. However, despite injuries, the additional 
warrior skills that a combatives program instills greatly outweigh this cost. This program 
provides Sailors much needed specialized instruction that has been absent from United 
States Navy training courses.  
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Countless articles detail the tactical side of combatives (how to punch, how to 
kick someone). Unfortunately, there is no definitive manual that details the development 
process. In combatives manuals, there are two sections: the why and the how. The why, is 
a very brief description of the history and development of a system. The how, is the 
techniques of the program. The primary focus of each manual is on “the how”.  
Literature review for the development of military programs is very limited. The 
Army combatives field manual only has a few paragraphs dedicated to the creation of 
their combatives program. The U.S. Marine Corps is similar in regards to historical 
documentation. The general theme for all articles involving the need and development of 
a military self-defense program is the same. Basically, there is a need for a consistent 
program that amplifies the combat capability of their servicemen. The Air Force went 
over a half century without a program. The Marine Corps and Army went over two 
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centuries without a consistent program. Through this long struggle to establish something 
substantial, only a few sentences explain the struggle. 
Appendix B contains a list of combatives manuals used for the research of this 
thesis. Through this research, we can piece together a solid thesis on why combatives 
programs are created. Additionally, we can use the justification to determine if the U.S. 
Navy needs a combatives program.    
 G.  METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
This thesis uses historical information to answer the research question. In Chapter 
II, we discuss that three out of four military branches in the United States provide service 
members with a standardized self-defense program. A significant question that needs to 
be answered is why each program was developed. Once this question is answered, a 
connection can be surmised as to why or why not the United States Navy is absent of one. 
First, the research provides an historical overview prior to each programs development. 
Second, the research focuses on the development of the present programs, specifically 
concentrating on why there was a need for each program.  
In many cases, the need for a self-defense program is obvious and welcomed. 
However, its implementation into the military machine is sometimes difficult. Third, we 
discuss what obstacles and challenges were faced when proposing a program. Obstacles 
and challenges to include: 
1. Implementation (How a program is implemented) 
2. Organizational Concepts (How a program is organized) 
3. Administrative Details (Who provides funding, equipment, locations, and 
who runs the program) 
4. Training Doctrine (Who is trained, when are they trained, and how often 
are they trained) 
5. Risk Assessments (What are the injury risks) 
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6. Political Obstacles (Did a new program compete with older or previously 
established concepts?) 
Fourth, after we address the obstacles and challenges, we discuss future 
challenges and the way ahead. This section of the critical research addresses what is 
being done to maintain each program, and what is being done for future development and 
prosperity. Finally, each program was developed to provide a special skill to improve the 
capabilities of the service member. This section details what effects each self-defense 
program has on the individual. Individual qualities to include: 
1. Combat Readiness 




Chapter III discusses international influence. Carrying over key variables from 
Chapter II, Chapter III briefly details the international combatives programs of Russia 
and Israel. Using the same research methodology, we cover: 
1. Historical Overview: Life prior to combatives 
2. Development  
3. Obstacles and Challenges 
4. Current Challenges and the way ahead 
5. Positive and Negative impact on the service members 
It is necessary to study not only the United States military but international 
militaries to determine a comparison. One independent variable that can be discovered 
through this research is what other Navies provide in regards to hand-to-hand combat 
training for their Sailors.   
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In Chapter IV, we focus on the United States Navy. This study first describes the 
history of the United States Navy in regards to hand-to-hand combat. Second, we provide 
an overview of the Navy’s current commitments throughout the world. To include the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States Navy fleet is tasked with missions around 
the globe. Additionally, as we mentioned previously, not only is the Navy tasked with 
increased responsibility in the frontlines, the Navy is required to maintain its traditional 
duties. These duties include: 
1. Master at Arms, security duties 
2. Watch-standing (Gate and Shipboard Watches) 
3. Shipboard Reaction Teams (Vessel Boarding and Inspection) 
4. Shore Patrol 
With wartime responsibilities, in addition to traditional Navy tasks, what is the 
strategic plan for the future of the Navy?   Third, as we address the risks that current 
Sailors face, what programs are available to develop combat skills?  What programs in 
the past were created, and why were these programs removed?  Finally, if the Navy is the 
only service without a standardized program, what obstacles and challenges prevent the 
Navy from moving forward to develop a program?  This answer might be as simple as, 
“the Navy does not require a program since the likelihood of a Sailor needing such skills 
is minimal and not cost effective.”   
In Chapter V, the War in Iraq and Afghanistan has been an evolving battlefield. 
Both coalition and enemy forces play a long, deadly chess match, which has been 
constantly changing at rapid pace. Non-state actors use many tactics to wound or kill 
United States servicemen. However, how have they fared against the United States 
military one on one, in a hand-to-hand combat situation?  What skills does the enemy 
have?  What circumstances placed United States forces in harm’s way, in particular, a 
hand-to-hand combat situation?  Due to the difficulty obtaining research information, the 
data is limited on this subject. We attempt to answer these questions: 
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1. What training does the enemy receive? 
2. One on one situation with the enemy: How has combatives helped? 
The data in this chapter may provide a reasonable argument as to why the Navy 
should dedicate the effort to develop a self-defense program. 
Several international armed forces train in the skill of hand-to-hand combat, not 
only provide survival techniques, but also to develop moral character and physical 
fitness. The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force all possess combative program that 
advertise the development of the warrior spirit. Despite a lack of combat for the majority 
of service personnel, self-defense is still considered an essential part of the soldier, 
airmen, and marines’ training and development. As a conclusion, Chapter VI offers a way 
ahead in the development of a standardized combative program for Navy.  
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II. THREE OUT OF FOUR AIN’T BAD! 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Two reasons are repeated throughout this thesis to justify the creation of a 
combatives program. The first reason deals with survival in combat. The second reason, 
articulated in different ways by each combatives program, is creating an individual 
mentality that is ready for combat. In this chapter, we focus on United States military 
combatives programs. Each program was created to teach servicemen survival skills, and 
to develop a warrior-like mentality.   
B.  UNITED STATES ARMY 
The mission of the U.S. Army Combatives School is to train Leaders and 
Soldiers in close quarters Combatives in order to instill the Warrior Ethos 
and prepare Soldiers to close with and defeat the enemy in hand-to-hand 
combat. 
— Mission Statement of Modern Army Combatives  
(U.S. Army, MAC Homepage) 
1. Brief History   
Prior to the development of the Modern Army Combatives (MAC) program, the 
Army had little to show in the area of standardized hand-to-hand combat training. Until 
then, hand-to-hand combat training was event and unit inspired. From the Army’s early 
battles, until the mid 1990s, hand-to-hand combat training was largely considered an 
afterthought. During each major war, hand-to-hand combat training was emphasized by 
units that required training. Once the war or conflict was over, the training was pushed 
aside or removed to make room for other training programs that were deemed necessary. 
 Prior to MAC, the training provided was based on what instructors were available, 
and were willing to teach. This meant the training was not necessarily appropriate for the 
needs of the unit. Often, martial arts styles were too traditional. The instruction did not 
teach realistic techniques in battle. The combatives instructors were often traditional 
martial arts teachers who never faced combat themselves. On other occasions, combat  
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hardened instructors taught techniques that became outdated as the battlefield and the 
enemy changed. A proper system was not in place to challenge techniques and adapt to 
current operational needs.   
As the story goes, in 1995, then Lieutenant Colonel Stanley McCrystal, the 2nd 
Ranger Battalion Commander, ordered the development of a consistent and effective 
combatives program. Headed by then Staff Sergeant Matt Larsen, the development group 
researched how to design a combatives program. Larsen and his team traveled the world 
in search of a combatives program. Various styles throughout the world were analyzed. 
As the team researched each style, they realized that each country had a specific reason 
for choosing a certain style (Paragon, 2010). For example, they noted that many countries 
chose a style for its military based on styles that were dominated by its culture (Paragon, 
2009). In the end, Larsen and his team agreed that Brazilian Jiu Jitsu was the ideal fit for 
the Army.     
Brazilian Jiu Jitsu (BJJ) is a ground influenced martial arts that was developed 
and made popular by the late Brazilian Grandmaster, Helio Gracie. Gracie, a small man 
in stature, was able to refine techniques that he learned from Judo and Japanese Ju Jitsu 
as a young boy. Gracie developed a system in BJJ that allowed him to use his small frame 
against much larger adversaries. BJJ affords a person the ability to fight a person on their 
feet or on their back. However, it is the ability to fight on the ground, effectively, that 
makes BJJ unique from all other martial arts. Most important, Matt Larsen recognized 
BJJ as the most effective martial art for MAC to build its foundation.   
The highlight of BJJ’s success is with the Ultimate Fighting Championships 
(UFC). Founded in November of 1993, the UFC is a mixed martial art event that pits two 
opponents against one another. Advertising hand-to-hand combat, with minimal rules, the 
UFC wanted to match the different styles of martial arts against one another to see which 
one was the best. There were no weight categories, no rounds, and fighters were expected 
to fight until one man was left the champion. Helio Gracie tasked his son, Royce Gracie, 




forms. Royce Gracie went on to win the first UFC by defeating all three of his opponents. 
After this first UFC tournament, BJJ has continued to maintain a dominant style in the 
world of martial arts.       
Matt Larsen believed that Brazilian Jiu Jitsu was beneficial for the Army in many 
ways. First, BJJ was used in the rough streets of Brazil in no holds barred competitions 
and actual fights. BJJ was a proven system outside the confines of a training facility. 
Second, the techniques of BJJ are easy to learn which allows a student to easily grasp the 
lesson material and move forward. Third, BJJ afforded Army practitioners a competitive 
base to improve and refine techniques for real combat situations. Finally, BJJ was readily 
available throughout the U.S. due its popularity because of the UFC.  
However, BJJ was far from the perfect martial art. Successful techniques from 
various self-defense systems are intermingled in MAC depending on the situation. For 
example, the effective takedown and throws of judo and wrestling are taught. The strikes 
of Boxing and Muay Thai (a devastating martial art from Thailand that focuses on strikes 
with knees and elbows) are used for offensive stand up techniques.     
As Larsen and his team began to learn the techniques, they began to manipulate 
them to cater to the self-defense needs of the soldier. Larsen designed a program that was 
comprehensive and allowed room for flexibility. With an established combatives program 
developed by Army Rangers, it was not long until the rest of the Army took notice, and 
the Modern Army Combatives (MAC) program was eventually established (Paragon, 
2010).  
2. Development:  A Rough Road Well Worth the Pain 
Matt Larsen faced many issues in development of a combatives program. As 
Larsen recalls, “limitations of institutional training, the many sources of divergent 
information and the natural desire for a quick fix that focuses on a particular tactical 
demand at the expense of developing a system that builds real skill” were issues that he 
faced (Larsen, 2007). In order to compete with these issues, Larsen had to develop a 
program that convinced the Army of its value. Larsen designed a program that was 
detailed in its approach and provided a soldier an opportunity to develop at a reasonable 
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level. Additionally, the program was designed to be user friendly for all service members. 
Another aspect that makes MAC unique is its ability to train soldiers to allow them to 
train others. With this approach, MAC can concentrate on spreading the techniques and 
principles of combatives to a larger audience.         
MAC’s headquarters is in Ft Benning, Georgia. However, certified Army 
combatives instructors are spread throughout the globe where Army battalions and 
Brigades are located. Additionally, MAC has several mobile training teams to certify 
instructors and train soldiers in what is required. MAC course qualifications are divided 
into four levels:   
a. Level I – 40 hours (1 week)  
b. Level II – 80 hours (1 week)  
c. Level III – 160 hours (4 weeks) 
d. Level VI – 160 hours (4 weeks) 
In his article with Infantry Bugler, titled “Combatives: The School House View,” 
Matt Larsen relies on several variables that guide the success of MAC:   
a. Skill Development:  Larsen believes in two components that are crucial to 
skill development. One component is accountability of standards set. He believes that 
each solider must be set to a standard in combatives and then held accountable. The 
second component involves the benefits of training these skills with another individual on 
a consistent basis. 
b. Situational Training:  This type of training is based on the lessons learned 
in combat. Situational training is necessary for combatives students to prepare themselves 
mentality for what they might expect in combat. An example that Larsen uses is 
providing a room-clearing situation that is reflective of current operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
c. System Principles:  To maintain the highest standards of MAC, Larsen and 
his team falls back on these eight principles to guide their future success:     
 
 15
1.  Standards – holding soldiers accountable for their training. 
2. Systemic Training – seen as a progression and not a short cut, 
MAC is designed to build on a foundation of teaching and learning.   
3.  Continuous Training – graduating the combatives course is not 
enough, the solider needs to constantly train his or her skills at their respective units.  
4.  Competition – hones fighting ability and gives soldiers the arena to 
test skills learned in a positive environment   
5.  Drills – used as a tool to refine skills and to assist with physical 
training 
6.  Live Training – helps in showing what real combat might be like 
with a live opponent  
7. Situational Training – incorporating combatives scenarios in 
training exercises give soldiers a feel for what they might experience in combat 
8.  Combat Feedback – lessons learned is critical for MAC to improve 
and mature 
3. The Benefits Outweigh the Risks 
The mention of hand-to-hand combat brings bloody images to the minds of many. 
The popularity of mixed martial arts (MMA) is growing in the United States. 
Nonetheless, despite its growth, there is a strong population that advocates against the 
violence of the sport. Despite MMA’s popularity, it has not received acceptance into 
mainstream media like football, baseball, and basketball. MMA is considered too violent 
compared to most sports that are viewed on television. However, there is a little evidence 
that proves MMA is more violent than established sports such as boxing and football. 
Additionally, on a military level, there is little evidence to prove that MMA offers greater 
risk of injury than running or weight training.   
There is minimal negative feedback from the Army in regards to the dangers of 
MAC. MAC injuries are no more intense than traditional Army routines (such as running, 
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marching, pushups, sit-ups). Additionally, MAC is arguably less injury intense than more 
dangerous training, such as Ranger School, or Airborne School. In regards to injuries, the 
benefits of the program seem to outweigh the risks. The proof of the Army’s praise for 
the benefits of the MAC program is MAC’s continued development and expansion 
throughout the Army. This is not to say that precautions for injury prevention are not in 
place. MAC instructors carefully watch and scrutinize every aspect of training. In areas 
that involve physical contact, every precaution is taken to ensure each solider is provided 
a safe, but realistic training environment. MAC has a very stringent Operational Risk 
Management (ORM) program in order to permit them to perform hand-to-hand combat 
training in the Army. With these operational restraints in place, the violence of hand-to-
hand combat is minimized.   
Despite the injury risks, the Army sees the benefits of MAC in its training 
curriculum. To date, MAC has over 900 testimonials from soldiers crediting their success 
to combatives training. Here is a list of five things that the MAC School describe as real 
combat situations to use combatives (cited directly from MAC PowerPoint):    
a. A compliant subject…suddenly becomes NON-COMPLIANT. 
b.  The Battalion indicates that an Intelligence Subject is so important that he 
must be CAPTURED. 
c.  The Number 1 man in a stack team encounters hostile opposition and has 
weapons MALFUNCTION. 
d.  When turning a corner in a bunker complex, an enemy grabs one of your 
soldier’s weapons and he is PINNED TO THE WALL. 
e.  In close quarters, an enemy attacks one of your soldiers under ZERO 
ILLUMINATION.     
4.  Current and Future Challenges 
The current challenge of MAC is staying relevant. In martial arts, the challenge to 
stay relevant is always present. It is only human nature to improve on what was once 
learned before. In a battlefield sense, Army combatives must focus on providing 
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techniques that give its soldiers the best opportunity to win. The basic principle to this is 
a common phrase heard in the military, “as we evolve, so shall the enemy.”   
An example of change to stay relevant is the adjustments MAC made to its 
program in late 2009. With the focus of the war shifting to Afghanistan from Iraq, there 
was a need to improve techniques in close quarters combat from the lessons of Iraq. After 
action reports recalled an increase in enemy contact entering houses and other confined 
areas. The grappling influenced MAC style quickly adapted to focus more on standup 
techniques (Little, 2009).   
Another challenge is to ensure the training of all Army service members. This is a 
daunting task for Army combatives due to the large size of the Army community. 
However, it can be done. Since 2002, there are over 57,000 graduates of the Army 
Combatives School (Little, 2009). MAC instructors are available on almost every 
location that houses Army service members. The job is placed on senior leadership to 
ensure all soldiers are given adequate time in their work schedule to qualify.  
One final challenge that MAC faces is ensuring that combatives is consistent with 
the daily routine of a soldier. Iraq and Afghanistan has worn down our services. 
Operational tempos of deployments take a toll on service members. As Army leadership 
makes efforts to allow more time for families, they must not sacrifice the essential tools 
that make the U.S. Army lethal in combat.         
C. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
MCMAP is integral to the development and sustainment of our Warrior 
Ethos and it continues to be updated based on lessons learned to better 
prepare Marines for the challenges of current and future battlefields. It is a 
key asset in developing both war fighting skills and character that all 
commanders should be utilizing to its fullest potential. 
— General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps (Mar 07 
message to USMC) 
1.  Brief History  
The United States Marines arguably boast the strongest reputation for war 
fighting skills of any force in the world. The U.S. Marines own the distinction of serving 
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in every armed American conflict in history. From its birth in 1775, up to the most 
current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, United States Marines do not shy away from a 
fight. During this long period of warfare, the Marines molded their riflemen to fight like 
warriors. Armed with not only their rifle, Marines armed with a fierce spirit and mentality 
that allowed them to be highly successful in the most harrowing situations. As they 
trained in combat skills, Marines also trained their mindset to create a balance that is 
quite unique in combatives. Aggressive, fearless, and taking the initiative, the Marine 
Corps created an exclusive breed. It is in this description that makes the Marine Corps so 
culturally unique from other war fighters.    
Since the Revolutionary War, the Marines have engaged in unarmed combat. 
There are moments in history that define the Marines combatives culture. In World War 
I, deadly trench warfare focused the Marine Corps to provide intensive training with the 
bayonet. This period of time was credited as the first period that Marines trained in hand-
to-hand combat skills.  
In post-World War I, arguably one of the most notable books in combatives 
history was published by W.E. Fairbairn. Fairbairn’s book, Scientific Self-defense, was 
based upon in earlier book titled Defendu. Fairbairn was an instructor for the Shanghai     
Police teaching the styles of Chinese Boxing and Japanese Ju Jitsu. Mixing these two 
styles together, Fairbairn created techniques that taught how to defend from an unarmed 
attack and restrain a person in close quarters situations. His justification for writing this 
book was simple. During the post World War I period in China, it was illegal to carry a 
gun which made the likelihood of unarmed conflict very high. Rex Applegate, a student 
of Fairbairn, modernized the techniques taught by Fairbairn for the U.S. soldiers in World 
War II, when he published a book in 1943 titled, Kill or Get Killed!     
By World War II, combatives skills for the Marines refined and incorporated 
training aspects to introduce the core values that are the foundation of the Navy and 
Marine Corps:  honor, courage, and commitment (MA 1.16, 2010). By the end of World 




the Pacific. Like the U.S. Air Force during this period, the Marines were influenced by 
the Asian martial arts. Several combatives styles developed from these multiple 
experiences. 
If we could argue one turning point in the focus of combatives for the Marines, it 
was during the Vietnam War. Then Lieutenant James J. Jones was fighting alongside a 
unit of Republic of Korea (ROK) Marines. During his period with them, he was 
impressed with the fighting spirit that was instilled within every ROK Marine. The ROK 
Marines displayed tremendous pride in their national identity. They demonstrated 
mastery in the martial arts, and personified the warrior spirit. The training and fighting 
skills that Lt. Jones witnessed was brutal and effective. So effective that when ROK 
Marines appeared on the battlefield with their unique jungle uniforms, the enemy feared 
them, and usually ran away. This impression left by the ROK Marines greatly affected 
the future Commandant of the Marine Corps.       
In 1989, the United States Marine Corps adopted the LINE System of combatives. 
L.I.N.E., which stands for Linear Infighting Neural Override Engagement, was designed 
for dangerous close combat conditions. It was the Marine Corps attempt to develop a 
standardized system. By 1999, the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, James J. 
Jones, directed his staff to develop a program based on the principles he witnessed with 
the ROK Marines in Vietnam. Gen. Jones wanted a program that focused on developing a 
strong warrior ethos for his Marines. With this directive, the Marine Corps Martial Arts 
Program (MCMAP) was born.       
2. MCMAP:  Not Your Daddy’s Combatives Program 
On paper, the MCMAP program is like any other martial arts program. Several 
manuals detail each set of requirements to attain each belt level in MCMAP. Each 
manual consists of positions and forms to start in, as well as techniques to execute, when 
faced with a certain situation. However, what MCMAP attempts to do, that arguably no 
other program attempts to do as extensively, is focus on the warrior spirit. The physical 
self-defense aspect of MCMAP is only a portion of the success. MCMAP believes that if 
you study the program and advance through the belt system, the student acquires the 
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necessary skills to survive in combat. What makes MCMAP unique is the concentrated 
focus on developing a Marine’s overall traits of physical, mental, and character. When 
the warrior ethos is refined and focused, embedding the martial arts side (the technique 
side) of MCMAP makes a truly lethal combination of warrior.       
The Marine Corps borrowed many traditional martial arts styles for MCMAP. 
Unlike the Army’s choice of Brazilian Jiu Jitsu, the Marine Corps uses techniques from 
mainly Asian sources such as China, Korea, Japan, and Thailand (Kennedy, 2003). It is 
hard to point out exactly what styles the Marine Corps uses because the Marines pick 
techniques from all sorts of self-defense styles. Throwing out techniques that do not 
benefit in combat, MCMAP picked only the combat proven techniques. Another contrast 
to the U.S. Army’s BJJ influence is the Marine Corps tries to avoid going on the ground. 
While the Army is grappling focused, the Marines are striking focused. Most Marine 
Corps techniques involve strikes and takedowns. This is not to say the Marines do not 
embrace certain elements of grappling. Grappling is only a small part of the big picture of 
MCMAP. The most important rule for Marines is to stay on their feet. 
3. The Three Disciplines:  Physical, Mental, Character 
It's like a three legged stool; you have to do all three (physical, mental, 
and character). If you don't and only do two or one of the disciplines you 
will fall on your face and the system will fail. There is no system equal to 
it to compare to. 
— Lt Colonel (RET) Schusko, Director of MCMAP 
(MCMAP Homepage)  
As then Captain Yi, USMC, comments, “MCMAP’s overarching purpose is to 
mold and strengthen the USMC collective identity, social structure, and culture” (Yi, 
2004).  
The Marine Corps, unlike the MAC system, relies on a belt structure from low to 
high, of tan, grey, green, brown, and black. The black belt ranks denoting an individual 
who has mastered technique, and exemplifies the warrior ethos and core values of the 
United States Marine Corps. 
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Area of focus of MCMAP is divided into three sections of physical, mental, and 
character. In Figure 1, we see the progression and the building blocks to becoming a 
complete Marine. 
 
Figure 1.   Physical, Mental, Character Synergy (From Yi, 2004) 
The physical portion of the synergy includes the elements of combative arts and 
combative training (Yi, 2004). Combative arts consist of unarmed training techniques as 
well as the foundation of Marine Corps fighting that include bayonet and rifle tactics. 
Combative training incorporates physical fitness with the techniques of combative arts 
through water and land training.    
The mental portion of the synergy educates Marines by what Captain Yi describes 
by, “studying the art of war” (2004). Marines go through a serious of knowledge  
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building courses that test their mental capacity and challenge them to think quickly and 
correctly.  History, combat tactics, decision making and planning, are a few courses that 
Marines must study.  
The last synergy, character, is a study in ethics, self-discipline, and mentorship. 
The key word to this section of training is restraint. MCMAP is trying to teach Marines 
that there are levels of combat in war. MCMAP argues that Marines are held to a higher 
standard, and need to make the right ethical decision in combat situations. Key tasks for 
this synergy are mentoring programs, understanding traditions and customs, and studies 
in ethics.   
Through the mental, physical, and character disciplines, a Marine warrior is 


















Figure 2.   Marine Warrior Ethos (From Yi, 2004) 
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4. The Present and Future of MCMAP 
Currently, over 98 percent of the United States Marine Corps is trained to tan belt 
(Lamothe, 2009). The United States Marine Corps trained over 11,000 instructors since 
MCMAP was founded. MCMAP has 1,500 black belt instructors currently, as well as 
over 10,000 green belt instructors. There is arguably a MCMAP instructor available at 
every Marine Corps location in the world. Currently, the MCMAP School can credit at 
least 25 actual combat experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan where MCMAP saved lives. 
Additionally, MCMAP has already trained thousands of Navy personnel. Mostly Navy 
corpsman, with future assignments to Marine units, these Sailors are required to certify at 
the tan belt level of MCMAP prior to graduating Navy Corps School. Also, MCMAP 
records three certified Black Belts in the Navy.  
The way ahead for MCMAP is to address key areas of concern to develop its 
program for the future. MCMAP sees a need to train more instructors. As standards are 
set, there is a general need in the Marine Corps to rise above these standards. Since young 
Marines are relegated by their rank to remain at lower belt levels, it is difficult for 
motivated Marines to advance further. However, as counter argument, superior technique 
is only one facet of the Marine Corps three synergies. Experience and a firm knowledge 
of the core values is a huge factor in promotion to senior belts.  
MCMAP is making efforts to provide more facilities of training for students. The 
Marine Corps Martial Arts Center of Excellence (MACE) has a special training mat that 
consists of recycled surgical gloves grounded up into mulch type material. This mulch 
type material allows MACE to boast an extremely low injury rate. As Director of MACE, 
Joseph Schusko comments, “When you’re falling on rubber, you’re less prone to get 
injured than if you go out on hard flats like we used to out here” (Lamothe, 2009). 
MCMAP is working on designing more facilities, to reach out to more Marines, to 
provide them the best possible tools to train. In this regard, it is a way for MCMAP to 
address concerns that some senior leadership raise with MCMAP injuries. Similar to 
MAC, some MCMAP students are not void of injuries. However, MCMAP’s injury rates 
are still no more than traditional forms of physical training. Similar to MAC, MCMAP 
recognizes the benefits of the training far outweigh the cost of injuries. As former 
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Captain Brian Stamm comments, “I think people need to be understanding, and 
commanders can’t just abandon the program because they get a few injuries from it 
because it’s just too invaluable to your guys mentally.” (Lamothe, Feb 2009).  
D. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
The combatives course is an excellent part of training. Based on the 
Army’s modern combatives course and intended for close quarters 
combat, it was definitely something new to me. Even if I never actually 
have to use this down range, the course provides a great basic skill set and 
builds confidence necessary for self-defense. As a female, the training is 
even more invaluable. 
— Captain Jessica Woods (U.S. AIR FORCE 
LIVE, May 10, 2009) 
1. Brief History 
When Air Force Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay headed the Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) in 1949, he took the recommendation of his aviators, and directed the 
establishment of formal combatives training for his Air Force pilots and crews (Svinth, 
Nov 2000). In World War II, American bomber crews faced devastating losses in Europe. 
Many bombers were shot down, with crews killed, captured, or evading capture. This 
dramatic period in Air Force history taught the seasoned bomber teams that training in 
self-defense tactics was a key element to future flight crew training.  
Initially, instructors were difficult to find for the Air Force. During the 1950s, 
martial arts schools in America were very limited. The number of servicemen who 
received training in martial arts was limited. Also, there was no television venue like the 
UFC to highlight which martial arts was the best. However, experiences in World War II 
with Japanese fighters advertised the effectiveness of their martial arts abilities. The end 
result was that several Air Force members received orders to Japan to train intensely in 
various martial arts. The style that was developed for the crews was a combination of 
Judo, Aikido, and Karate.  
Judo is a style deeply rooted in the art of throwing and restraining an attacker 
once on the ground. Although the martial art has a long, ancient history of self-defense  
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and combat, Judo evolved in the 20th century as more of a competition sport. However, 
several takedown and submission techniques established in Judo laid the foundation for 
BJJ.   
Karate, another ancient art, relies strictly on the stand up techniques of punching 
and kicking, using arms and legs to block and counterattack an opponent. Karate is rooted 
in a deep foundation of stances and systematic moves called kata. Through drills, kata 
moves are refined until they are embedded in instinctive reaction.  
Aikido is a relatively new martial art that was established in the 20th century with 
deep ancient root. Like BJJ, Aikido is a refinement of Japanese Ju Jitsu and was created 
as a non-lethal way to subdue an attacker. Using an opponent’s enemy against it, the 
strength of aikido was its ability to provide techniques to defend against multiple 
attackers. Aikido is very popular in the law-enforcement communities throughout the 
world. The wristlocks and subduing techniques that Aikido offers provides law-
enforcement officials a non-lethal way to deal with criminals.  
A 320-hour program was established for Air Force crews for the initial program 
(Svinth, Nov 2000). This was the starting point in the Air Force’s history of combatives 
training. The purpose of combatives at that time was twofold: develop unarmed combat 
skills and improve physical fitness (Durnil, 2010). The program included several values 
that airmen improved with in training to include (Svinth, Nov 2000): 
a. Physical Coordination 
b.  Balance 
c.  Relaxation 
d.  Combative Skill 
e.  General Physical conditioning 
f.  Mental and Physical Alertness 
g.  Confidence 
h.  Courage 
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i.  Aggressiveness 
j.  Self control 
k.  Restraining techniques 
l.  Physical Coordination 
In 1959, a 159 hour combatives course was developed (Svinth, Nov 2000). As Air 
Force combatives progressed, many airmen became very proficient in the Japanese 
martial arts. In 1962, Air Force records account for 160 black belt level instructors and 
over 20,000 crewmembers qualified in the course (Svinth, Nov 2000). In 1964, the Air 
Force even credited their training to sending four members to the summer Olympic 
Games.       
Unfortunately, combatives training to the Air Force flight crew curriculum did not 
last. During the end of the 1960s, combatives training was removed from training. The 
reason for removal was also twofold:  to speed up training and to cut costs (Svinth, Nov 
2000). The elimination of martial arts in the training program was so swift and complete 
that, “Over forty years later…there is virtually no institutional memory of the program 
within the active Air Force or its historical branch” (Svinth, Nov 2000). 
Despite the loss of combatives for aircrew training, the Air Force Academy 
maintained a presence in hand-to-hand combat with the sport of boxing. The intended 
result for this program was twofold: improve competition and develop courage in a 
stressful environment (Durnil, 2010). This type of training at the Air Force Academy 
once again proved successful in a sports themed manner: 18 Team National Champions 
(104 Individual), and 287 All-Americans (Durnil, 2010). The result for both bomber 
crews and boxers was similar:  Physical fitness was improved, hand-to-hand combat 
capability was increased, and an Airmen’s character in a harsh environment was tested 
and developed.   
2. Birth of AFCP 
After an absence of over forty years, in October 2007, the Chief of Staff of the 
United States Air Force ordered the development of a standardized Air Force combatives 
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program. The Air Force’s reasoning was simple, due to the current operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; more Airmen are in harm’s way. U.S. Air Force senior leadership 
recognized the push for increased joint operations and its duty to provide capable 
warriors to the fight. The Chief of Staff ordered the creation of a combatives program 
with a “Warrior Ethos” theme (Durnil, 2010). Lieutenant Colonel Adelson, Deputy Chief 
of the Air Education and Training Command comments, “We have always produced the 
smartest airmen ... ready to go out and do the mission ... but now we are producing 
warriors. The Air Force combatives is just another facet of that warrior production.”  
(Army Times, Jan 29, 2008). 
Once the Chief of Staff issued the directive, a task force was created to decide on 
what program to create. After several trials of available programs, the Air Force decided 
on the Army’s combatives model. The Air Force chose the Army mold, as Matt Larsen 
recalls, “because of our past successes” (Army Times, Jan 29, 2008). Additionally, the 
Air Force had culture compatibility with the Army due to multiple joint operations 
between the two services. With the help of MAC founder, Matt Larsen, the Air Force 
pushed forward in the development of its own program.    
By November of 2008, a program was approved and in development (Durnil, 
2010). In September of 2009, the United States Air Force Combatives Program (AFCP) 
was born. During the same time, the Air Force Combatives Center of Excellence was 
founded, under the supervision of the Air Force Education and Training Command 
(AETC).      
Here is a list of desired “learning outcomes” directly from the Air Force 
Combatives Center of Excellence:  
1. Establish Common Warrior Ethos throughout Air Force 
2. Acquire Basic Unarmed Offensive and Defensive Skills 
3. Expose Airmen to Full-Resistance Submission Grappling Skills 
4. Cultivate Courage and Instill Confidence 
5. Develop Ability to Think and React under Pressure 
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6. Develop and Practice Aggressive Mindset and Mental Toughness needed 
to Survive  
Currently, all future Air Force officers are required to train in AFCP. These 
officers in training are required to complete a ten hour combatives module. The Air Force 
Academy boasts an estimated 1,000 cadets trained in the course (Durnil, 2010). At 
Maxwell Air Force Base, over 4,000 students of OTS, ROTC, and ASBC are trained each 
year (Durnil, 2010). 
Although injury risks are not yet published, one interesting statistic surfaced 
throughout the many decades of Air Force Academy boxing training. The Air Force 
Combatives Center of Excellence notes that not one cadet lost a commission or training 
hours from injury (Durnil, 2010). As of this thesis, combatives in the Air Force received 
favorable feedback from students. Additionally, the level of injuries is minimal.  
What makes the development of AFCP unique, and provides a strong argument 
for a Navy copy, is the lack of actual hand-to-hand combat experiences. As the brief 
history of combatives in the Air Force told us, the need for a combatives program was 
reactionary. Stemming from severe experiences behind enemy lines, self-defense was 
added to the training curriculum. For AFCP, its creation is quite proactive. The Air Force 
realized that there is a possibility of unarmed action, and a genuine hunger to develop a 
warrior mentality within the airmen community.     
3. The Way Ahead 
The next phase in the development of AFCP is to implement a training program 
for the enlisted airmen. However, several issues need to be addressed before 
implementation. Logistical issues, need for instructors, certification criteria, and safety 





As the Air Force Combatives Center of Excellence comments, some future plans 
for AFCP are to:   
1.  To train ALL Air Force personnel in AFCP. 
2.  Establish a combative school house (as a main hub of combatives training 
similar to Ft Benning’s location for MAC) 
3.  Specific AFCP modules will be created for each airman’s Military 
Occupation Specialty (MOS).  
E. CONCLUSION 
The United States Army developed a combatives program out of a need to 
standardize its hand-to-hand combat training. Through its development, the MAC 
program provided soldiers with tools to assist them in self-defense. The United States 
Marine Corps developed a program that not only provides Marines with self-defense 
skills, but more importantly to them, provides Marines with character building skills. The 
United States Air Force developed a program that models after MAC. Despite the Air 
Force’s minimal operational need for hand-to-hand combat skills, the benefit of building 
confidence and character in every Airman was a major contributor in program 
development.     
The largest issue of a combatives program is injury. This issue is mitigated 
through quality control features such as direct instructor supervision, safety equipment, 
and strictly enforced rules and regulations that limit damage. All three programs argue 
that the benefits of combatives outweigh the costs. The improvements in character, 
confidence and capabilities are seen in all three programs. In the next chapter, we discuss 




III. INTERNATIONAL COMBATIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On an international level, two countries, Russia and Israel, possess outstanding 
examples of combatives programs for its military forces. The country examples in this 
chapter argue the reason for developing a combatives program internationally is very 
similar to the reason U.S. military services developed its programs. 
Similar to the benefits of U.S. combatives programs, international combatives 
promote a strong warrior ethos, as well as a technically proficient soldier. For some 
countries, the development of combatives was born out of necessity and survival, with a 
secondary function of character development.   For other countries, martial arts is looked 
more as a way of life (character building) with the added benefit of providing an 
advanced skill set for a soldier. However, despite two paths in the reason for development 
of a combatives system, both paths are arguably important, complement one another, and 
justify each example’s future combatives development.  
B. RUSSIA 
1. History 
Russia has a long, storied history in martial arts. Considered a tribal skill, it was 
passed on from generation to generation up until the 6th century (Shillingford, 2000). At 
this point, the tribal warriors had to rely on these skills to defend against attackers 
invading the countryside. With every attack, the martial skills of the tribes improved, and 
their skills reached a climax with the Mongol invasion and occupation starting in the 13th 
century (Shillingford, 2000). However, after the Mongol invasion, up until the revolution 
of 1917, there was a sharp decline in martial arts skills (Shillingford, 2000). The 
significant reason for the decline was the invention of weapons that limited the focus of 
unarmed combat (Shillingford, 2000).    
In 1918, with Lenin in control of the now named country of the Soviet Union, he 
ordered his staff to develop a combatives system (Shillingford, 2000). The reason for his 
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directive was to combine the various martial arts styles that evolved in the different tribes 
into one national model (Shillingford, 2000). By combining all the styles that existed in 
Russian history into one model, Lenin also eliminated the national culture that was 
developed throughout the centuries for the sake his communist regime. The research team 
traveled to various parts of the world researching martial art styles. Similar to how the 
United States military combatives systems developed generations later, the Soviet Union 
created a martial arts style that comprised of the very best techniques of each martial art 
system. Lacking an official name, this martial art system was simply called Systema 
amongst its practitioners. 
Using Systema, and with further modifications, an established Soviet martial art 
was developed, called SAMBO. SAMBO is a Russian acronym that stands for 
Samozashchitya Bez Oruzhiya. SAMBO’s Russian translation “is a martial art without 
weapons” (Shillingford, 2000). From the early roots of the Russian tribes, SAMBO is the 
recognized martial arts for the nation of Russia as we know today. SAMBO was designed 
as a martial art that was simplistic, and was designed to be taught to the lowest level of 
the Russian population.           
Developed in the 1920s, SAMBO’s strength is in its grappling skills. Due to 
centuries of repelling attack from foreign invaders, the Russian tribes were heavily 
influenced by the different unarmed styles they witnessed. In particular, the Mongolians 
brought an ancient style of wrestling to Russia. Wrestling is a basic foundation to the 
style of SAMBO. Also, similar to Brazilian Jiu Jitsu, concepts of Judo and Japanese Ju 
Jitsu were added as well. Giving credit to past history and the research done by Lenin’s 
development team, dozens of other varieties of martial arts was also added to strengthen 
the striking side of SAMBO. Due to Lenin’s focus of maintaining a unified national 
identity, all other styles of martial arts were banned from the Soviet Union. Only 
SAMBO was taught. Pressure from the government forced the principles of SAMBO to 
as many Soviet citizens as possible. From these roots, SAMBO was taught to civilians 
through mediums such as the public school system. In government, SAMBO was taught 
to police, military and government officials.  
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2. SAMBO:  The Reasons for Its Use 
SAMBO has two recognized forms: combat and sport. Sport SAMBO, which is 
executed in tournaments and competitions, is the non-lethal form of combat SAMBO. 
Sport SAMBO removes striking techniques and focuses on the grappling aspect. A win is 
achieved by the most total points at the end of a match, or by submission, which is 
defined by an opponent conceding defeat, or losing consciousness due to a choke 
technique.  
Combat SAMBO is taught for survival. Lethal blows and devastating joint locks 
are added to neutralize an aggressor. Russian military forces use protective gear to 
minimize injury during training. The military and security forces focus extensively on 
Combat SAMBO for training.  
As we focus on the military side of SAMBO and combatives, the reason for the 
existence of a program is for self-defense. As we stated previously, the history of Russia 
is one of constant war. Prior to the advent of effective weaponry, unarmed combat 
reigned supreme throughout the Russian countryside. During the 21st century, warfare 
contributed to the deaths of many millions of Russians. In World War II, Hitler’s German 
Army fought entire cities in the Soviet Union. Military and civilians assisted in repelling 
Hitler’s army. It was a national urgency for all citizens to be able to defend themselves.  
The Russian military is trained in some level of SAMBO, to include its Navy. 
When we argue why combatives is needed in the U.S. Navy, we can look to the Russian 
philosophy as further example of proving our point. SAMBO is taught to the military out 
of possibility. Even from the early Russian tribes, self-defense was taught not for the 
reason of why, but for the reason of when. The Russians believe in being prepared for the 
worst, and in their mindset, the inventible. Simply put, “you never know when you might 
need it.”         
SAMBO’s benefits to the Russian military are it provides a tool for self-defense 
as well as promote a national identity. Although the intention was to provide the 
necessary tools for self-defense, SAMBO evolved into a mental strengthening tool as 
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well. Through training, conditioning and competition, SAMBO is credited for instilling a 
warrior mindset, one of confidence and courage in a stressful environment.         
C. ISRAEL 
1. History  
During World War II, the British Army entered the region of Palestine and 
recruited the assistance of Jewish fighters against the Germans (Wagner and Nardia, 
2010). Within this group of fighters, on May 14, 1941, the British established the 
Pal‘mach, a Jewish Special Forces team (Wagner and Nardia, 2010).  
The Pal‘mach was trained in every aspect of combat: small arms, to hand-to-hand 
combat, physical conditioning and small unit tactics to name a few. This training was 
called Kapap (Wagner and Nardia, 2010). Not related to one particular evolution of 
training, Kapap was used as a broad term to summarize what the Pal’mach worked on. 
However, this term was generally referred to when discussing the hand-to-hand 
combatives training of Israel. 
Once Israel became a nation state in 1948, combatives in the country was 
constantly refined and tested in real world situations. Through terrorist attacks and nation 
state takeover attempts, the Israeli combatives system was polished through bloody 
engagements.  
2. Kapap 
Kapap was the first CQB training introduced in Israel and was based on 
stick fighting, knives, guns, and hand-to-hand and even stone throwing in 
the old days. The idea is to fight with what you have available in your 
hand. 
— Avi Nardia, 2010 (Avi Nardia, Kapap 
Combatives) 
Similar to MCMAP and MAC, Kapap does not focus on the traditional aspects of 
Martial Arts. There is no bowing or uniforms. The focus is on neutralizing your aggressor 
and making sure that you come home alive. When the British began training the 
Pal’mach, hand-to-hand combat training was a mixed bag of techniques to include boxing 
 35
and wrestling. Knife fighting and handgun disarmament techniques were emphasized. 
Kapap, as the hand-to-hand combat was now referred as, took the most effective 
techniques and refined them. In 1949, the Pal’mach was removed from service and 
replaced in 1953 by another commando team, Unit 101 (Wagner and Nardia, 2010). The 
Kapap combatives system survived though, and for the next several decades remained a 
stable in Israeli commando training. However, due to the fact Israel was in constant 
conflict, the need arose that all military service members should train in combatives 
(Wagner and Nardia, 2010).   
3. Krav Maga   
The original concept of Krav Maga was to absorb any martial art that was 
useful by taking the most efficient techniques that would work in a combat 
environment, yet with minimal instruction time. Even today recruits 
receive only a few hours of mandatory training. 
— Wagner, J and Nardia, A., 2010 (Inside the 
Martial Arts) 
During the decade of the 1980s, Krav Maga became the established combatives of 
the entire Israeli military (Wagner and Nardia, 2010). It was a simplified version of 
Kapap, and was taught at the basic training level to all recruits. Training only consisted of 
a few hours of instruction but provided recruits with a minimal impression of unarmed 
combat (Wagner and Nardia, 2010). 
Despite the creation of Krav Maga, Israeli commandos still regard their 
combatives system as Kapap (Wagner and Nardia, 2010). Kapap was designed for the 
most hazardous conditions of a commando, while the average Israeli citizen could use 
Krav Maga. Many in the Israeli commando community feel that Krav Maga is “too basic 
and is reserved for beginners,” (Wagner and Nardia, 2010).  
4. Israeli Combatives 
The benefits to Israeli combatives are instilling mental strength, confidence, and 
aggressiveness to an Israeli service member. However, the primary reason combatives 
was established is survival. The Israeli military routinely faces a difficult time in regards 
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to the self-defense of its borders. Despite its young history as a nation, Israel is very 
experienced in the art of warfare. Whether the mission is to fight off terrorist attack or 
nations, Israel forces itself in a constant state of vigilance.      
Alongside Brazilian Jiu Jitsu, Krav Maga is on the rise in popularity in the United 
States. Advertised as a lethal, effective, and efficient system, Krav Maga is a popular 
martial art for physical conditioning as well as personal self-defense for the working class 
population in the United States.  
Whether it is Krav Maga or Kapap, combatives is a part of the national culture of 
Israel. Every citizen of Israel serves an obligated tour of duty in the military, and is 
exposed to combatives. Similar to Russia’s reason for a combatives system, Kapap and 
Krav Maga’s roots were out Israel’s national urgency that every citizen must be able to 
defend the land from aggressors.  
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
One point of interest in regards to the two foreign systems is the type of martial 
arts system that is selected.  In most cases, the system that is developed for military use is 
a recognized martial art of that particular country. Russia and Israel developed martial 
arts styles that were largely influenced from outside its borders. Traditional martial arts 
techniques were taken, modified, and refined into respective arts such as Kapap and 
SAMBO. However, some countries use established martial arts systems with roots that 
trace back to Confucius and Sun Tsu. Generation after generation studied a particular 
martial art. This martial art became embedded into the national identity, to include its 
military. One country that we did not cover but can use briefly as an example is the 
Republic of Korea, with Tae Kwon Do. Practiced at an early age by a majority of 
Koreans, Tae Kwon Do is a part of the national culture. It is available in almost every 
town, and taught in the school systems. The country’s military incorporated Tae Kwon 
Do because almost every citizen was familiar with it in some respect. In this sense, we 
can argue that developing a different system, or introducing another style might prove 
difficult.     
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In early combatives history for the United States, the selection of a martial arts 
style had little to do with national culture. Martial arts were not prevalent in many cities 
like it is today. Even now, you would be hard pressed to find a martial art offered in a 
public school. The early founders of combatives systems relied on their experiences 
abroad, during peacetime and wartime endeavors. Traditional martial arts systems such as 
Judo and Karate were selected as self-defense style. However, even during the early 
period of combatives development in the United States, there was a strong desire by 
developers to incorporate several styles for the reason of effectiveness. For these reasons, 
the promotion of martial arts in the United States is a slow, difficult process. The United 
States does not own deep roots in any martial arts system. In this regard we can see a lack 
of synergy with other institutions in society such as schools, sports, and clubs. Martial 
arts are not accepted on a national level in the United States compared to countries like 
Russia and Israel.    
As we look at martial arts today for the United States, we can argue that MMA is 
slowly starting to embed itself in our national culture. We can see that with the countless 
MMA gyms that opened up around the country, as well as the media popularity it 
receives with its events. From the military point of view, the martial arts programs are a 
cornucopia of different styles from all over the world. From a national point of view, 
mixed martial arts are an example of the diversity in the United States. We can classify 
this diversity as a melting pot that reflects the United States. The strength of this melting 
pot of martial arts is its flexibility. The varied martial arts systems give the United States 
the ability to pick and choose which techniques are appropriate. More important, adapting 
and changing styles prove difficult for the deep institutional martial arts roots of other 
countries. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Similar to the United States, Russia and Israel developed combatives due to a 
need to teach survival skills and to develop a better overall warrior. Russia standardized 
its combatives program to ensure a communist identity, while crushing its previous 
ancestral cultures. Additionally, a program was created to ensure that every Russian 
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citizen was capable of fighting the enemy. Israel developed a program to create more 
efficient fighters in battle. Through this development, combatives developed the 







IV. RAISE YOUR HAND IF YOU KNOW COMBATIVES! 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is one unique quality of the United States Navy that sets them apart from 
the rest of the military services, and that is the sea. In order to fight at sea, the Navy 
developed lethal weapons to maintain sea superiority. From the old sailing ships, to 
battleships, to the aircraft carrier and submarine, the Navy relies on many platforms to 
maintain the peace. These weapons of war are the foundation of naval power. The Sailor 
is the driver that steers these vessels to its destinations. The Navy has the ability to strike 
at enemies while maintaining its position at sea. Having the ability to attack foes from a 
distance keeps the Navy away from close combat. For this reason, the Navy Sailor is not 
considered a frontline element like the Marine, or Army soldier. With the events of 9/11, 
the very culture of naval warfare changed. In many cases, the weapons of combat are no 
longer the hulking grey ships and planes. They are replaced only by the Sailor, with a 
rifle and his or her training.      
B.  BRIEF HISTORY  
During World War II…several top naval officers realized that efficient 
and effective close quarters fighting skills were needed by all Naval 
personnel, not just high speed, low drag units like the Scouts and Raiders 
or the fledgling UDT units. Surface Sailors, submariners, rear echelon 
supply types, and perhaps most of all, aviators who risked being shot 
down over enemy territory were just as needy and deserving of quality 
close quarters training. 
— Dan Trembula, MIDN, USNA, 2003, (discussing 
the establishment of the V-Five Program in In 
Quartata Magazine) 
The United States Navy tradition spans over two centuries of combat. Similar to 
the United States Marine Corps and Army, the United States Navy shares the load of 
many wars, and conflicts through history. The United States Navy’s history of hand-to-
hand combat begins during the Revolutionary War. Sailors fought side by side with 
Continental Marines, led by famous Naval Captains such as John Paul Jones. We can 
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argue during this period of history, to include the War of 1812, that the Navy would reach 
its peak in close quarters combat. As the world transitioned from the age of sail to the 
power of steam, so did naval warfare. Fighting between ships was largely kept at a 
distance. Stronger hulls and more powerful cannons afforded crews the luxury of attrition 
and a simple plan: firing volleys until the other ship sunk or retreated. By World War II, 
with the further advancement of ships and naval gunfire, distances and firepower 
increased. The Battle of Coral Sea in 1942 became the first sea battle where two opposing 
fleets were out of sight, using only aircraft. By this time, aircraft power dominated the 
Navy scene as an essential element to naval warfare.     
Also in 1942, the use of aircraft played a role in the development of one of the 
only known unarmed combat systems in the Navy. With aviators needed in both Pacific 
and Atlantic theaters in World War II, there was a strong chance of being shot down 
inside enemy territory. Pilots and aircrews needed to prepare themselves to survive 
behind enemy lines. Seeing a need to train aviators with unarmed combat, Lieutenant 
Junior Grade Wesley E. Brown, a former collegiate wrestler and police officer, was 
tasked with program development.  
Lieutenant Junior Grade Brown helped develop the “V-Five” Program. The 
material was developed as a technical manual, as well as a set of instructional videos for 
aviation candidates.   
V-Five advertised itself as a “no-holds barred” style of fighting that involved 
chokes, eye gouges, bone breaks, and other techniques that were seen as realistic to 
combat. Brown and his team believed that this style was ruthless because it was 
necessary. He stated, “Today, as we face enemies who recognize no fair play, the 
technique of man-to-man competition must be drastically revised to fit the tactics of war. 
Suspended for the duration is the code of sportsmanship. Now there is only one rule, to 
win.”  (Brown, 1942). Brown’s philosophy is eerily familiar to the code of warfare that 
many U.S. military combatants face today.    
During World War II, the V-Five Program trained aviation students extensively in 
unarmed combat. Using wrestling as a base for grappling and takedowns, V-Five relied 
 41
on strong elements of boxing for strikes, and Japanese Ju-Jitsu for joint locks and breaks. 
Training was intense. Brown and his team believed in training in an environment that 
would simulate real time combat (Trembula, 2003). Aviators were drilled repeatedly until 
moves became second nature.      
Dan Trembula commented, “Through sports, the men were indoctrinated with the 
group loyalty and psychological mindset required in combat…” (Trembula, 2003). 
Wesley Brown acknowledges that he trained over 10,000 aviators during World War II 
(Brown, 1951). The V-Five Program had two effects: one, it helped develop and prepare 
aircrews in hand-to-hand combat and two, it improved team integrity and morale through 
the intense training.  
Unfortunately, V-Five Program died following World War II. During the 
transition to peace, there simply was not a need for it. Like many programs that started in 
World War II, they were removed as reactively as they were installed.  
World War II began the trend for aircrews to require additional training from 
normal fleet Sailors. The opposition of being shot and captured was a reality in combat. 
The Korean and Vietnam Wars would witness countless airmen downed behind enemy 
lines. However, despite the number of pilots in harm’s way, the last program that was 
officially recognized was the V-Five program. Additionally, in World War II, the world 
would witness the last of the naval battles between ships. Technology afforded the Navy 
to remain at a distance from unarmed combat. The Navy saw a growing shift in fighting 
culture at the end of World War II. From a long tradition that was prepared and expectant 
of close combat, the Navy transformed into a service that removed close combat from its 
mindset.  
The Navy was in the safe confides of the sea during the major wars of Korea and 
Vietnam, unchallenged. Even in Desert Storm in 1990, Navy ships fired missiles and  
rounds unmolested. The idea of close combat, survival and evasion, was reserved for a 
select few units such as aviators, corpsman, Sea Air Land (SEAL) teams, and Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operators. 
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C.  IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: A UNIQUE TIME FOR THE NAVY 
In this section, we discuss the current combat operational tempo of the United 
States military. It is important in this thesis to discuss the high stress placed on human 
resources and how it relates to combatives. We discussed in detail the importance of 
combatives training from a character building side. This section discusses the importance 
of combatives training on a tactical and operational level.  
When the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars began, the U.S. military dedicated its 
services in the typical manner it had done for decades. Army and Marine units moved in 
to take key positions on land. The Air Force provided air transport and fire support. The 
Navy provided support in the manner of their naval battle groups in close proximity at 
sea. Any combat related units on the ground consisted of a small number of corpsman, 
SEAL and EOD teams. 
Both wars were expected to end quickly. However, fast forward to 2010, that 
assumption is incorrect. The war fighting is intense, and arguably some of the most 
vicious in history. The enemy is not a large army mass similar to World War II and 
Korea. The enemy is using guerilla warfare tactics. Fighting indirectly, and striking the 
U.S. and its allies in a war of duration, and not attrition. Seen as an irregular, 
unconventional war, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan give us an outlook of the future 
wars to come.  
At the start of the wars, the United State Army was expected to carry the bulk of 
the ground fighting duties. As the U.S. realized the wars were to last longer than 
expected, troop deployments were increased. Six-month deployments became 12-month 
deployments, and then became 15-month deployments. Marine Corps troop levels 
increased as well. Servicemen in the Army and the Marine Corps were asked to return 
multiple times, with very little time to compensate for back home. As the years went by, 
the United States Army still had the lead with the war fighting effort, but they needed 
help.  
Joint operations increased during these wars. Prior to 9/11, joint operations were 
largely seen as ceremonial. Services conducted joint exercises and operations in a much 
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smaller scale. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars forced the services to work together to 
create a more cohesive fighting force. With the Army and Marine Corps overburdened, 
tasking was implemented to assign Air Force and Navy personnel to take the load in 
forward positions on the ground. United States Air Force and Navy personnel were 
assigned to positions such as security (police) teams and support. As the need for more 
and more airmen and Sailors grew, the duties placed on them did as well. Additionally, 
for the first time in history, the United States was witnessing the largest concentration of 
Air Force and Navy personnel on the combat field.  
When you compare the first guidance message from the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) post 9/11, to the most recent guidance of 2010, the influence joint 
operations now has on the Navy is quite clear. In the 2002 message, the CNO is quoted as 
saying, “Presence…power…precision” as he explains the Navy response to 9/11 (CNO, 
2002). The Navy relied on its force projection at sea with limited special units on the 
ground in Afghanistan as was expected at the time. The notable difference for 2010’s 
CNO guidance is that the CNO describes the Navy using the term “forward presence” as 
a description to describe the increased ground fighting efforts of the Navy (Roughead, 
2010). With these two documents, we can argue that the Navy is starting to understand 
that many more of its Sailors are going to participate in close combat.  
A study conducted in December of 2009, reported that almost 400,000 Sailors 
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan (Tan, Dec 2009). The numbers of actual deployments 
increase to almost 600,000 when you consider many Sailors were ordered to deploy 
multiple times (Tan, Dec 2009). This is in comparison to the Army’s totals, which is 
almost triple in number with one million total troops, and over 1.5 million total 
deployments (Tan, Dec 2009). The Navy totals are low compared to Army numbers, but 
high when you consider the Marine Corps deployed over 250,000 troops combining for a 
total of almost 400,000 deployments (Tan, Dec 2009). 
From a ground fighting aspect in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States Navy is 
involved. We can argue that tactically and operationally, training Sailors in combatives 
provides the U.S. military with the most capable fighter for combat. 
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D. WARFARE DESIGNATIONS, AND THE REASON TO TRAIN THEM IN 
COMBATIVES 
The Navy is arguably the most multi-faceted service in the military. With ships, to 
subs, to amphibious operators, to SEAL and EOD teams, pilots and aircrews, and security 
personnel, the Navy has various warfare designations. In the following sections, we detail 
certain warfare designations in the Navy, as well as specific jobs that need combatives. It 
is important to discuss these jobs in the Navy to provide a clearer picture that self-defense 
training is necessary.             
1. SEAL Teams  
The United States Navy SEALs have a long and storied military tradition. From 
their inception in 1962, the SEALs have been in the front line of combat for the Navy. 
Starting in Vietnam, the SEALs earned a reputation for their stealth by their ability to 
snatch and grab victims and disappear into the jungle and swamps. In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the SEALs still rely on their stealth and elements of surprise to fight the 
enemy. With this said, the SEALs are the trademark example of Sailors that have the high 
potential to be up close with the enemy.     
As of this thesis, the Navy SEALS do not have a standardized program in place 
for their teams. Their individual combatives programs are inconsistent. Each SEAL 
Team’s combatives is contracted out. The style of combatives is dependent on the 
instructor that is contracted and the style that particular instructor is a master of. Through 
each decade, the SEALs relied on combatives from various sources. During some 
periods, the SEALs relied on simply no combatives training at all. Also, because of the 
high operational tempo, combatives training is dependent on command, team, and 
operator schedule. There is no standard for combatives like MAC or MCMAP that the 
SEALs follow. The need for them to have standardized combatives training is quite clear. 
It is also disturbing to note that an elite Special Warfare operator lacks the combatives 
training that a basic rifleman or solider receives on a daily basis.    
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2.  EOD Teams 
Navy Explosive Ordnance Teams are routinely asked to enter various parts of the 
world that is considered dangerous. Tasked with various global assignments, Iraq and 
Afghanistan are two countries that Navy EOD deploys. Navy EOD teams are assigned to 
operate with SEAL and Special Forces teams in potential close-quarters situations. 
Additionally, they are assigned to work on their own, or with other international partners. 
EOD operators have an inherently dangerous job working to defuse bombs. However, it 
is the nature of getting to the bomb that makes EOD’s job just even more dangerous. On 
some occasions, EOD operators are required to enter very hostile areas that place them in 
a position for attack or ambush. 
Currently, Navy EOD is in the development phase of a combatives program for its 
operators. However, similar to the SEAL teams, the operational tempo dictates the 
success of a program into the normal routine.      
3.  Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces 
The “Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a scalable force spanning 
the full range of military operations from Theater security to major combat” (NECC, 
2010). NECC personnel bring a wide range of tasks warfare. From security operations, 
humanitarian assistance, and other broad areas of warfare, the NECC advertises the 
ability to work in all environments. Additionally, the NECC plays a pivotal role in 
providing support and combat related units to the war effort.  
NECC personnel are required to receive pre-deployment training that consists of 
basic combat skills. The combat skills do include a few hours of hand-to-hand combat 
training. The fact that NECC personnel receive limited hand-to-hand combat training 
means two things: one, the training is already established in a curriculum and two, 
because training is already established, it is easier to focus on the quality and 




4.  Aviators 
Technology develops at a rapid rate for the military. However, as technology 
increases, the same dangers remain the same for some jobs. This is the story for the pilots 
and crews that fly the planes for the U.S. Navy. We discussed the importance of the V-
Five program, and why aviators need combatives training. With continued flights into 
harm’s way in Iraq and Afghanistan, aviators still require training in self-defense.    
5.  Individual Augmentees 
In contrast to a Sailor that deploys with a ship, squadron or unit, a Sailor 
who leaves their assigned unit or command to deploy individually or with 
a small group is known as an Individual Augmentees (IA). 
- Navy Individual Augmentees Homepage (2010) 
Individual Augmentees, or IA personnel can be selected from any warfare 
designation in the Navy. The selection is based on a volunteer and involuntary basis. For 
the Sailors selected, it is based on the need for an IA in a particular assignment in the war 
regions.    
IA personnel are trained by the U.S. Army in combat skills prior to deployment. 
IA training facilities are located at over two dozen locations throughout the United States, 
and do provide IA members with a limited amount of MAC training.  
6.  Military Police 
Military police have wide tasking nowadays due to Iraq and Afghanistan. Military 
police can be assigned anywhere that requires legitimate military law enforcement 
presence. In particular, police personnel are often selected to IA billets to assists in duties 
such as training host nation security forces or detainee operations.    
Out of all the jobs in the Navy, we can argue that military police receives the most 
standardized training in combatives compared to other warfare assignments. We can also 
argue that due to the nature of their work, military police need to invest extensively in 
hand-to-hand combat training in order to maintain the advantage with an aggressor.   
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However, that is not good enough. There is no data to show that there is a consistent 
program fleet wide for military police. Military police command training is dependent on 
the command and how much they wish to train.    
7. The Fleet 
In this thesis, we describe the fleet as: personnel on ships and submarines, as well 
as shore installations. This is the point of contention for many folks to question why we 
need a combatives program. Many Sailors on ships and submarines will never step foot in 
a combat zone. However, the fleet is where a huge chunk of the IA duties are assigned. 
Additionally, we cover various jobs of a fleet Sailor later on this chapter that argues why 
combatives is needed as much for the fleet Sailor as a SEAL or EOD operator. A 
shipboard Sailor or submariner might not see combat abroad, but there is always a 
possibility that combatives might be needed to defend their ship.  
When we discuss the fleet further, we must go back to the second reason why 
combatives is important to a serviceman. The fleet can use combatives as another method 
of team building. On a long deployment at sea, away from home, combatives can provide 
an outlet for positive growth in a Sailor. 
The jobs listed are a collection of existing institutions in the U.S. Navy. We can 
argue that the difficulty of establishing a combatives system is not necessarily to prove its 
effectiveness, but to change the deep-rooted traditions of each institution.        
E. “BASIC” JOBS THAT MAY REQUIRE COMBATIVES 
Several basic jobs in the fleet require extensive combatives knowledge. The jobs 
are termed basic because they are typically a collateral duty for a Sailor on top of their 
primary assignment. Each job is a typical assignment seen aboard a ship or at a shore 
command. Although they are basic, a failure in any one of these assignments could lead 
to a catastrophic incident. The amount of combatives training that is taught at these levels 
is minimal or inconsistent.     
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1. Quarterdeck Watches 
The “quarterdeck,” in Navy terms, is the initial entrance of a ship. When a visitor 
walks aboard a commissioned Navy ship, they are first greeted on the quarterdeck. The 
quarterdeck watch holds two major positions. One position is the official representative 
of the ship, and her commanding officer. The second position is security. The quarterdeck 
watch is essentially the last line of defense against an aggressor. Armed typically with a 
sidearm, the quarterdeck watch is considered one of the most basic duties for a Sailor.  
Quarterdeck watches are not typically trained in hand-to-hand combat, although 
the escalation of force procedures that they are taught seem to require that knowledge. At 
the lowest levels, escalation of force procedures start at verbal orders (such as “STOP”) 
to neutralize an opposition. At the highest level, which is the last resort, deadly force is 
authorized in a situation that the quarterdeck watch deems life threatening or a matter of 
national security. The middle levels involve physical contact, from blocking, to restraint, 
to incapacitation. Once again, the levels are dependent on the judgment of the 
quarterdeck watch of the situation. As we discuss the duties of the quarterdeck watch, and 
their role as the “first and last line of defense” for the ship, we can comment that most 
quarterdeck watches in the Navy do not receive any form of combatives training to assist 
them in restraint, and incapacitation techniques.  
2. Master at Arms 
The Quarterdeck is the first and last line of defense. However, when there is time, 
the Master at Arms can provide some assistance. Designated as the duty “sheriff” on 
watch, the Master at Arms is in charge of various tasks such as issuing weapons, making 
sure watches are standing guard properly, and implementing shipboard security drills. An 
obvious duty as well for the Master at Arms is restraint of an aggressor or prisoner.                            
3. Gate Guard 
A gate guard is another member of a ship or command that is initial security upon 
entering a compound, or walking on a pier to get aboard a ship. The sole purpose of the 
quarterdeck watch is to check for identification and provide additional security.    
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4. Shipboard Reaction Teams 
Shipboard Reaction Teams is a collateral duty for certain members of a ship. 
Primarily assigned to personnel that are knowledgeable with weapons, the purpose of a 
reaction team is to defend the ship at all cost, or provide offensive firepower as a last 
resort.     
5. VBSS 
An acronym that stands for Vessel, Board, Search, Seizure, VBSS teams became 
a highlight to the Navy’s force projection post-9/11, due to the increase in waterborne 
security throughout the globe. The rosters of VBSS teams are similar to reaction teams. 
They are picked from capable members of a ship’s crew. By direction, they stop 
suspicious vessels, and perform an inspection of its personnel and cargo. VBSS missions 
are considered dangerous due to the element of the unknown when boarding vessels. 
VBSS teams must be prepared to restrain and neutralize aggressors if necessary.      
6. Shore Patrol 
The last of our basic assignments for an on duty Sailor, shore patrol is a team of 
Sailors assigned to walk the town at a port of call where Sailors are based. Shore patrol is 
tasked with patrolling areas with high concentration of Sailors to ensure they are 
upholding the rules and regulations of the U.S. Navy. When a Sailor breaks the rules or 
simply becomes unruly, it is shore patrol’s duty to remove the Sailor and bring them back 
to the ship. Shore patrol is not armed with anything but a radio. In order to keep the 
peace, it is necessary at times for shore patrol to restrain a Sailor to prevent them for 
further harm or damage.    
F. CONCLUSION  
As we discussed the difference between the CNO Guidance for 2002 and 2010, 
we realize that the military is slowly evolving into a unified force. Prior to 9/11, the Navy 
was still developing its skills in regards to full spectrum warfare. Despite the overall 
capabilities of the Navy to effectively engage in warfare on all three environments (land, 
air, and sea), the Navy still does not act on the need for additional training in close 
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combat tactics. As the Iraq War draws down, the Afghanistan War increases in intensity. 
Concerns with troop rates and morale greatly affected the decision makers in assuring a 
balance to the number of deployments for each service member. The request for IA’s 
remains strong, which means the chance for combat is still present. 
The U.S. Navy has deep roots in combat. Despite a history that proves the need 
for combatives; the Navy does not embrace this need. Currently, the United States faces 
two land wars that stress military capabilities. Non-traditional ground fighters like the 
U.S. Air Force and Navy are tasked to share the burden of combat with its Army and 
Marine Corps brethren. The chances of hand-to-hand combat are minimal, but still 
present in some circumstances. Additionally, as we analyzed the different jobs in the 
Navy, we can argue that the possibility of self-defense is present in all areas to varied 
levels of degrees.          
 51
V. THE ENEMY, AND THAT ONE-IN-A-MILLION CHANCE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
We discussed the combatives programs for the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps. We also discussed the lack of a combatives program for the U.S. Navy. 
Additionally, we traveled abroad, and found similarities as to why specific countries 
developed combatives programs for its militaries. In this chapter, we focus on the enemy. 
For the purpose of this thesis, we categorize the enemy as those persons who fight against 
the United States and its allies, from World War II until the present day. We argue that 
the reason for the development of an enemy combatives program is similar to that of any 
other combatives program: to develop a more technically proficient warrior, as well as 
boost confidence, and morale.  
Statistically, we can argue that the chance of a U.S. servicemen engaging in hand-
to-hand combat is minimal. As stated previously, the number of documented accounts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan for the U.S. Army is roughly 900. The number of Marine Corps 
events is roughly 35 cases. From almost ten years of fighting, when you divide 935 into 
the approximately 2,000,000 soldiers that cycle back and forth in the combat zone during 
that time, the percentage is very small.     
B.  THE ENEMY  
While most nation states of the world advertise freely their combatives systems, 
the hand-to-hand combat methods of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist 
organizations is largely secretive. From combat experiences, confiscated material, and 
posts on popular sites such as YouTube, we are at least able to form an opinion that 
combatives is a consistent part of enemy training. 
In World War II, the Japanese were a formidable enemy of the United States. 
Many soldiers lived the code of the Samurai, called Bushido. Bushido was a way of life 




Bushido taught the Japanese to embrace it. When the war ended, the Japanese slowly 
developed into an ally for the United States. It was then possible to learn Japan’s martial 
arts styles that proved effective against the U.S. 
In the Korea War, American troops faced a North Korean force with elements of 
the Chinese military. Both countries were well versed in its national martial arts and 
proved formidable in combatives techniques. Additionally, martial arts proved an 
immeasurable ally in regards to mental strength, confidence, and courage.  
In the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese offered the first real look at the type of 
war the United States would fight in the future. Outnumbered, the North Vietnamese used 
the terrain to its advantage against the American fighting force. Using the strategy of 
surprise, and hit and run tactics, the North Vietnamese made every attempt to isolate 
American service members to either kill or kidnap. Additionally, the dramatic effects of 
unaccounted service members who disappeared into the jungle still remind many why we 
need to train to our best ability. 
With current enemies of the United States and its allies, we see the same 
mentality that made previous enemies so effective. First, the enemy relies on a certain 
philosophy to mentally strengthen them. With the Japanese, it was Bushido and the 
Samurai tradition. With Al Qaeda for example, it is the extreme Islamist belief that Jihad 
creates a world free of non-believers. Teaching a philosophy that death brings great 
reward, Al Qaeda programmed its followers to not fear it. Second, the enemy believes 
that they are defending their homeland from invaders. This was the case with the North 
Vietnamese and their drive to fight for a war of duration, and not attrition. The North 
Vietnamese believed they were defending their homeland. We can compare this to how 
Americans fought during the Revolutionary War. These two reasons provide the mental 
strength for the enemy to go to war with an overwhelming force like the United States.  
C. THE CURRENT OPPOSITION 
You really want to learn how to rip somebody’s throat out? I’m talking 
about damage to the inside so they drown on their own blood. 
— Tarik Shah, talking to undercover agent, 2004 (Feuer, 2007) 
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Tarik Shah was convicted in 2007 on terrorist related charges. A musician, and an 
avid martial artist, Shah played the role of a normal New Yorker while secretly  
aspiring to become a martial arts instructor for Al Qaeada. Shah claimed experience in 
Jiu Jitsu, and had a hatred for Americans. He was more than willing to assist terrorists in 
killing Americans (Feuer, 2007).  
In 2004, an Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad was discovered in England during a 
security raid. The Afghan Jihad is an extensive encyclopedia that consists of eleven 
volumes (Dodd, 2006). The content of the encyclopedia contains very specific 
information in regards to terrorist tactics. In particular, one chapter emphasizes hand-to-
hand combat. The contents of the Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad, for obvious reasons 
were not released to the public. However, an index of the book was made available by the 
AP Press in 2001. Chapter Nine of the volumes is titled “close fighting” (AP Press, 
2001). The description of the chapter is very brief, but provides a good picture of how 
coordinated the terrorists are in training:  “Physical fitness; Aekido and other forms of 
self-defense; how to overcome a rival; attacking with knives and chairs, and moves to 
release from a grip” (AP Press, 2001).   
Several videos are available on the internet that involves hand-to-hand combat 
training. Used as recruiting videos, the videos show very brief clips of one-on-one, hand-
to-hand combat training. Elements of striking and takedowns show that the terrorists 
possess some formal training in martial arts. One video in particular, was one released 
prior to 9/11. Osama Bin Laden was in sections of the video, and it showed training 
footage of hand-to-hand combat training (Breibart, 2005). This clearly shows that even 
prior to 9/11; Al Qaeda was training in combatives.   
D. ACTUAL EVENTS  
The following section provides three examples of hand-to-hand combat incidents 
in during the current wars. On each occasion, a service member’s primary and secondary 
weapon was unavailable in the situation, which left nothing but the hand-to-hand combat 
skill of the service member.  
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Then he jumped up on my back, broke my night-vision goggles off and 
starting getting his fingers in my eyeballs. I pulled him over, and when I 
hit down on the ground, it popped my shoulder back in. 
— Master Sgt. Anthony S. Pryor, 2003, (Cosher) 
Master Sergeant Anthony Pryor, a Special Forces Team Sergeant, eliminated four 
enemies in close quarters combat during a nighttime operation in January 2002. One 
enemy, pulled his night vision goggles off, and pulled his arm out of his socket. Facing 
the enemy in unarmed combat, Pryor used his survival skills to eliminate the enemy.  
While Gibson was throwing punches, he could feel the man’s hand 
reaching down to “grab a knife or something to attack me and then he told 
me in English he said ‘bomb’ and I realized he had a bomb on him and he 
was trying to clock himself off. 
— SPC Joseph Gibson, 2008, (Cavallaro) 
In April of 2008, SPC Joseph Gibson was an Army Ranger in Iraq. During a 
patrol, Gibson stepped into a ditch right on top of a suicide bomber. Unable to fire at his 
enemy due to the fact he was clearing the thick grass in front of him, Gibson jumped on 
top of his attacker.  The attacker fired shots, but Gibson was able to position himself out 
of line of fire. Gibson was in unarmed combat with the enemy due to his close proximity. 
Both Gibson and the enemy were trying to reach a weapon. Gibson eventually overtook 
the bomber with a series of blows that allowed him to break free and kill the aggressor 
(Cavallaro, 2008). 
During the Battles of Fallujah in 2004, United States Marines were involved in 
arguably some of the most intense fighting in Iraq. The large city was invested with small 
alleys and streets. Thousands of insurgents littered the city and hid within the houses. The 
Marines had to flush them out in a door-to-door fashion. During these battles, the 
Marines would partake in several hand-to-hand combat encounters (Peterson, 2004).       
These three examples provide us with real data on the effectiveness of combatives 
training. Each soldier was faced with a life-threatening situation that tested their mental 
and physical capabilities. It is difficult to measure the variables of confidence, courage,  
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and warrior mindset. When we see examples of real combat situations, we can argue the 
necessity of combatives training. This is when we can gauge those variables very clearly 
and justify the benefits of combatives.  
E. CONCLUSION 
There is no question; the enemy is out to kill Americans and its allies. Although 
not as refined and polished as military systems, enemy hand-to-hand combat training is 
no less intense. When in a hand-to-hand combat situation, a service member must be 
prepared. The enemy employs every method at his disposal. The examples in this chapter 
provide a no holds barred look at the technical reason why combatives is necessary. 
Additionally, the attempts to train terrorists in martial arts skills through instructors and 
training manuals clearly show that the enemy is teaching a mindset that is not afraid to go 
face to face with its enemy.   
As for the mental aspect, combatives training is just as effective to train the spirit 
of an adversary as it does an ally. We can explain the enemy thought process using the 
“hard target” approach. A hard target can be defined as a soldier that is difficult to defeat 
because of their posture. “The posture” is the offensive and defensive tools that determine 
the “target level” of a soldier. In this thesis, a hard target is a prepared and capable 
combatives warrior. On the opposite spectrum, a person that is not trained in combatives 
becomes an “easy target” or “target of opportunity” for the opposition. We can relate 
back to former Marine Corps Commandant Jones and his experience with the ROK 
Marines in Vietnam. The reputation of the ROK in combat allowed them to avoid many 
conflicts with the enemy. They trained themselves to become hard targets. In this regard, 
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VI. GETTING UP TO SPEED AND FINAL COMMENT 
A. DOES THE NAVY NEED A COMBATIVES PROGRAM?   
From the early traditions of the United States military in the late 18th century, 
until the late quarter of the 20th century, hand-to-hand combat training was largely 
considered an afterthought and trivial compared to the “real” rigors of training for 
combat. Any sort of development of combatives was slow, inconsistent, and eventually 
faded away, typically around the end of a major war, or conflict. However, despite the 
slow start, the current U.S. combatives programs are accelerating and maturing at 
fantastic speeds. Years of refinement improved each combatives program. In particular, 
ten years of brutal combat at the start of the 21st century honed combatives techniques. 
Most importantly, combatives is recognized not only for its self-defense, but for its 
ability to develop the overall character of a service member.    
As we wrap up this thesis, we must now consider the very first question posed:  
Does the U.S. Navy need a standardized combatives program?  Looking over the 
historical background, as well as the future challenges of the Navy, the answer is 
arguably yes. From a combat standpoint, U.S. Navy combatives training is needed far 
less than U.S. Army and Marine Corps components. In fact, if we only look from a 
statistical standpoint, and argue about the minuscule percentage that actual hand-to-hand 
combat does exist in war for the United States, we can dispute that combatives training 
should be at the least, de-emphasized. However, the point is often lost on the real purpose 
of combatives, which is the fundamental strength and argument why it must be kept:  
Combatives, when executed (trained) properly, is an essential tool to develop a person’s 
overall character and performance. 
If we look at the effectiveness of combatives from a numbers standpoint, to be 
more clear, from a “how many actual incidents have we had” the argument is weak that 
we need to develop a program. However, if we look at combatives as a warrior 
development standpoint, the argument is very strong. Although combatives is a very 
physical training program, the physical aspect is just the surface of what is going on 
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inside a human being. Statistical data is not available currently on the psychological 
benefits of combatives in the military. Reason being, it is very difficult to measure areas 
that involve emotions. There is no data that shows a direct link between combatives and 
the overall performance evaluation of servicemen and women. On paper, combatives 
training is just one of many qualifications a service member undertakes during a career. 
The only current way to judge why combatives is needed is by what people are doing, 
and saying about it.  
From an operational standpoint, we can still argue that the U.S. Navy does need a 
combatives program. As we move away from conventional warfare, we must embrace 
irregular warfare as the method of 21st century fighting. First, the United States military 
steadily increased emphasis on joint operations. What this means quite simply is that 
traditional service roles are being put aside for a more unified approach. As stated 
previously, all services are being asked to do things that traditionally are not required. In 
respect to the Navy, this comes specifically with IA’s in the current land fight, as well as 
increased emphasis of SEAL and EOD teams. Second, the U.S. Navy has commitments 
on a fleet level that requires combatives skills. These skills include basic duties such as 
watch standing, shore patrol, security, law enforcement, and ship’s reaction force 
assignments that require this knowledge. Additionally, more advanced duties include 
riverine operations, VBSS, special warfare to name a few. Also, we must not forget the 
need to add combatives in basic survival training for our pilots and aircrews. Third, as we 
follow the Navy guidance of slimming down to create a stronger, more flexible, and 
technically superior Navy, the lack of combatives training only counters the point. 
Having a Navy combatives program is proactive, and proves that the U.S. Navy is 
thinking ahead into the future of warfare, and to the development of its “warrior Sailors”. 
The United States Army began its combatives history by developing a system that 
would help them defend themselves in an unarmed combat situation. This system, thanks 
to Matt Larsen, became an ever-evolving system that adapts to the ever changing 




nurtured a system that embedded itself in the very culture of Army life. MAC is a tool 
that not only enhances a soldier’s war fighting ability, but also enhances a soldier’s 
character development.  
The United States Marine Corps, tested throughout history in the most difficult 
forms of combat, developed MCMAP to provide Marines the best possible chance of 
survival. However, tools for survival in the combat zone are secondary in MCMAP 
culture. MCMAP’s design is to develop tools that build fundamentally strong ethical 
warriors. This warrior ethos is instilled to every Marine. Similar to MAC, the MCMAP 
program is part of every Marine’s way of life.                 
The United States Air Force recognized the need for a combatives program. Piggy 
backing off of the MAC mold, the Air Force is developing a program primarily to help 
positively shape the warrior spirit into future Airmen, while also providing them skills 
that enhance survival in a combat environment. The Air Force recognizes that hand-to-
hand combat is not likely for all airmen, but is possible for a scant few from time to time. 
However, this did not deter the Air Force from seeing the benefits of a combatives 
program. Emphasis is placed on the need for combatives to develop key areas of an 
Airmen’s character.     
Internationally, we can argue that there is no fundamental difference as to why 
certain countries have a combatives programs. There are usually only two answers:  to 
develop that warrior spirit that is needed in combat and daily life, and to provide the 
technical skills to defend oneself, if needed, in battle. We can further argue that similar to 
American military systems, combative programs in the countries discussed in this thesis 
started out for a simple reason, and nurtured and developed into something more 
complex:  to provide tools necessary for self-defense, and to build strong warriors of 
solid character. Once again, even internationally, combatives is also a fabric of daily 
military life.       
Here are five reasons we can argue why combatives is good for the U.S. Navy: 
1. Improves combat readiness (gets the Navy prepared for the 21st century 
way of joint operational war fighting)  
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2. Strengthens Navy Core Values (The Navy version of Ethical/Warrior 
Sailors) 
3. Improves Physical Fitness  
4. Improves Confidence 
5. Develop Mental Strength in Tough Situations/Environments 
B.  IT STARTS WITH ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE:  CHANGE IS GOOD   
The idea of, “it has never been done before, because we have never needed it” 
needs to change to, “it has to be done, because we might need it.”  The most difficult part 
of establishing combatives into the United States Navy is changing the culture and 
turning the Navy away from the status quo. Similar to Matt Larsen’s struggles, the 
bureaucratic wheel must recognize that combatives is a necessary cog. Sometimes major 
change in the military is difficult. When you consider changing culture, you can count on 
change being very difficult. In order to do this in the simplest way, we must teach Sailors 
that combatives is a good thing.  
If we change the culture of the Navy from the bottom up, the top-level officials in 
the Navy might recognize its importance. There will be many doubters, similar to the Air 
Force, as to why combatives is not needed. Between the Navy and the Air Force, we can 
easily argue that these two services have the least amount of incidents by far compared to 
the Army and the Marine Corps. However, the Navy needs to get on board with the real 
reason why combatives is embraced by the other services, and that is the opportunity to 
develop character and improve the overall capabilities of the Navy.     
Changing culture is a slow process. It is on a generational timeline. From MAC’s 
and MCMAP’s inception, there were many skeptics. However currently, the majority of 
skeptics deal with the technical aspects of the programs (what combat technique is the 
best for a certain scenario for example), and not “why” the programs are still around. The 
first, best move for the Navy is to initiate the establishment of a training program. The 
Navy needs to establish a program that emphasizes the importance of combatives from  
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initial indoctrination. The justification is to change a mindset that is embedded in 
previous generations. To truly affect change for the long term, we must start with the next 
generation, and mold their mindset to embrace combatives.   
C. STEPS TO ESTABLISHING A NAVY PROGRAM:  A FOUR-STEP 
PROGRAM  
1. Navy Leadership:  Recognize, Initiate, Order, and SUPPORT   
Prior to any further steps, and if any success is to be achieved, the leadership of 





Navy leadership must finally recognize that combatives in the military is here to 
stay. This is the one time that the Navy needs to follow the lead of the other services. In 
the Marine Corps, it started with the Commandant issuing a USMC-wide message stating 
the importance of combatives in their daily life and training. The need for combatives 
must be recognized fleet wide, from the Admirals and Master Chiefs that lead the Navy, 
to the young Sailors that guide the Navy in the future.  
The initiation of a program is the start of a long journey. MAC and MCMAP 
constantly refined its tactics and techniques from inception. Arguably, the toughest part 
of starting anything new is the mere effort of starting it. A necessity for the program’s 
success is to put Sailors to task. The order to start Navy combatives should come from 
the top and be recognized from the bottom up as a necessary component. Upon initiation 
of the MCMAP program, further directive was given to all Marines, ordering them to 
qualify to the minimum standards of the MCMAP program. 
Finally, as the Navy orders its Sailors to perform a function it feels beneficial, the 
Navy must provide them with the support they need. Support starts with positive  
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guidance and leadership, as well as time allocation, and areas for training.   There is not 
one successful combatives program in the world that does not have the support of its 
leadership to move forward.  
2. Beg, Steal, or Borrow MCMAP     
MCMAP is recommended for the U.S. Navy. MCMAP is tried, tested and 
approved by countless operators in combat. It is a well-established system that does not 
need to be built from the ground up. Similar to the Air Force partnership with the Army, 
the Marine Corps has ready assets available to assist the Navy in combatives training and 
development. Also, the Marine Corps and the Navy operate together on various military 
fronts and understand each other’s culture. 
The Air Force appreciated the template created by Matt Larsen and his team. 
Tried and tested, MAC is a system the Air Force relates to. Using an already established 
system also saves countless of man hours in the development of a new system (that also 
might not be successful). MCMAP is a system that thousands of Sailors were already 
exposed. Additionally, future combative Sailors can relate to the Marine Corps method 
since both services are from the same service department.    
When it comes to training, the United States Marine Corps is experienced in 
training Sailors. Two examples to cement this point home: at OCS, the United States 
Marine Corps provides intense and influential instruction to groom officer candidates. 
Second, the Marine Corps has MCMAP, which provided life saving instruction to Sailors 
assigned to Marine units.     
The Marine Corps has multiple mobile training teams that are capable of training 
future Navy trainers in martial arts. Able to train any group of Sailors in all areas of the 
world, these mobile training units are vital to success. Once the first groups of trainers are 
trained, the Navy can spread the knowledge throughout the fleet. Additionally, along with 
mobile trainers, permanent trainers can be assigned to these locations to assist in 
development and training:   
 63




These locations represent another avenue to assist in cultural change in the Navy. 
From the recruit, candidate, Midshipmen level, the Navy can focus firmly on the 
development of the future of Navy warriors. By molding the next generation during 
initial military training, the Navy can move forward quicker to erasing cultural and status 
quo issues that might arise. Additionally, new Sailors are prepared to enter the battle 
quicker, because they received training.  
3. Sailors Train Sailors 
All service combatives programs use a “virus” type of network set up in regards 
to training. As the MCMAP instructors successfully train and qualify Sailors, those 
Sailors train other Sailors. It is through this process that the U.S. Navy will successfully 
spread combatives throughout the fleet. The Marines are very capable in their training; 
however, without the help of the newly trained combative Sailors, the spread of 
combatives will become a slow process that could prove detrimental. The Navy must task 
newly trained Sailors to train other Sailors at their respective commands or units.        
4. Cut the (MCMAP) Umbilical: Establish the Navy Self-Defense 
Program (NSDP) 
The Air Force is well on its way to cutting the umbilical from the Army. An Air 
Force combatives manual is due out for official release very shortly. Until then, the Army 
is shadowing the Air Force and providing support in moving the combatives program 
forward.     
After we successfully embed MCMAP into our foundations, there will come a 
time when the U.S. Navy needs to move forward and establish its own program. When 
will we know to cut the umbilical?  The United States Marine Corps has MCMAP 
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training available at every installation owned or occupied by the Marines. Although this 
benchmark is not exactly necessary for umbilical cutting, it is a good guideline to where 
the Marines are with their development. A critical concern for maturity of Navy 
combatives is to make sure that access (trainers and facilities) is available for every Sailor 
to train. Key objectives for success in order to cut the umbilical are: 
a. Established Navy Self-defense Program Headquarters 
b. Navy instruction/guidance manuals/certification criteria 
c. Enough Navy trainers to send the Marine trainers home 
d. Recognize ORM 
A primary headquarters must be established to become the subject matter expert 
in Navy Combatives as well as account for standards and instructions in combatives. 
From this headquarters, the Navy can task instructors and mobile teams to help train 
Sailors at various commands or deployed areas.     
D. NSDP:  PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT  
1. Emphasize Core Values    
The Navy Self-defense Program needs to emphasize the three core values that 
shape the Navy:  Honor, Commitment, and Courage.   
With Honor, NSDP honors the sacrifice of warriors in the past by training and 
shaping warriors of the future. Combatives instills the ideal of honor by respecting other 
shipmates, building character, and establishing a foundation of integrity through NSDP. 
With Commitment, the Navy recognizes the need to prepare itself for an increased role in 
the joint operational world. Also, NSDP shows the commitment the Navy has to 
developing future Sailors for war. With Courage, NSDP teaches combatives to instill the 
character traits that make U.S. Sailors the very best in the world at what they do.      
2. Emphasize Physical Fitness 
The U.S. Navy must recognize that combatives can be an easier outlet to physical 
fitness than by traditional methods of running and swimming. For example, a submariner 
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or a deployed at sea Sailor has limited choices to improve physical fitness. Over time, 
with the lack of physical exercise, we see a drop in physical capability. With NSDP in 
place, combatives can be taught in very limited spaces and still benefit the Sailors.  
If we refer to the U.S. military combatives systems already in place, combatives 
provides great benefits to the soldiers and airman. The exercises and sparring sessions 
have the same benefits to cardio and strength training as traditional exercises. 
Additionally, military combatives is a recognized form of exercise.           
3. Depth and Requirement of Training 
MCMAP uses the belt system, while MAC uses the level system. In order to 
maintain continuity, NSDP should retain the belt system designed by MCMAP. As a 
matter of common sense, a submariner does not require the same amount of training as a 
Navy SEAL in combatives. However, a standard must be set that carries the baseline for 
future Sailors. The United States Marine Corps set the standard that all Marines qualify at 
a minimum, tan belt. The lowest belt in the MCMAP ranking system is a reasonable 
request for any able bodied service member. More importantly than belt qualification, 
ensuring that a Sailor maintains his or her qualification is critical.  It is pointless to 
qualify in a skill if over time the techniques are not practiced and maintained. Similar to 
the semi-annual physical readiness test, the Navy should require mandatory re-
qualification for combatives readiness. Combatives, like many qualifications, is a 
perishable skill that needs constant refinement. In this thesis, we can use military gun 
qualifications as an analogy to the importance of refresher training. However, an 
argument can be made that some Navy occupations require less frequent training. Here is 
an example of time frames of refresher training: 
a. Deployment (to include IAs):  Refresher training mandatory within three 
months of any operational deployment         
b.  EOD/SEALs:  Annual Training, due to frequent deployments in combat 
zones. 
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c.  Pilots/Air Crew:  Annual Training, due to frequent deployments in combat 
zones. 
d.  SEABEEs:  Bi-Annual Training 
e.  FLEET:  Bi-Annual Training 
4. Development Guidelines 
The success of all combatives programs requires constant refinement and 
feedback from its users. Combatives instructors should be their own harshest critics. In 
order to survive, combatives must stay relevant and effective to the current operation 
situation. As we discussed in Chapter Two, Matt Larsen uses an excellent outline for his 
Army system to maintain readiness:    
Standards:  High standards in the U.S. Navy are expected. A self-defense program 
should not be installed if standards are not created and met. The Marine Corps set the 
standard that all Marines certify at the minimum, the rank of tan belt. For the Navy, this 
should be the minimum as well. Additionally, Sailors must be held accountable for 
achieving these standards.    
Systemic Training:  The Navy cannot take short cuts and rush training. A strong 
NSDP foundation, with gradual, positive progression creates a long term return.  
Maintain Qualifications:  Similar to issues with maintaining physical education in 
the military, U.S. Navy Sailors must be encouraged, ordered, and provided adequate time 
to maintain NSDP techniques.   
Competition:  As we recall back to the history of the Army and Air Force in 
regards to combatives, we can see that competition improves many aspects of a 
servicemen’s technical ability and character. Competition sharpens the mind and 
technique. It provides a Sailor an opportunity to test what was learned. Most importantly, 
through command level competition, it brings units closer by providing a venue to come 
together.  
Drills: This area goes hand-to-hand with continuous training; Sailors must drill in 
their technique to make them a natural part of their instincts.  
 67
Live Training: Drilling can only do so much for a Sailor. One on one training with 
an opposing force brings realism of combat while providing a safer avenue for training.  
Situational Training: The U.S. Navy needs to integrate lessons of NSDP into 
exercises such as general quarter drills, security reaction force exercises, or operational 
scenarios for land based teams.  
Feedback:  After action reports and feedback is crucial to the development and 
maturity of the program. Every step must be made to allow for critical feedback of 
NSDP.  
E. CONCLUSION 
During every period of warfare in the 20th century, the military services of the 
U.S. Army and Marine Corps developed programs to help with unarmed tactics. Even in 
World War II, the U.S. Navy and Air Force joined in to train specific units of combatives. 
However, necessity of removing combatives training for other programs was a dominant 
theme throughout the 20th century as well. The idea of teaching folks to fight to develop 
character and warrior skills was never understood until just recently. Despite minimal 
experiences in combat situations, several combatives programs still exist because it helps 
develop a better soldier. Confidence, character, and a drive to become a superior warrior 
are common results to combative practitioners. 
The United States military has two proven combatives programs with MAC and 
MCMAP. The Air Force developed a program that is similar to MAC, and took dramatic 
steps in the past few years to becoming fully operational. MCMAP provides a perfect 
vessel for the future of Navy combatives. Through MCMAP, the U.S. Navy can develop 
a course that can cater to the numerous jobs throughout the fleet. As a future goal, a Navy 
Self-defense Program should be developed. As an end goal, all services should mold 
together to develop a joint combatives programs that is interchangeable with each service 
requirement.  
At the time of development, there was not a critical need for combatives in the 
Army and Marine Corps. However, both programs were developed because it was 
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understood that one day that need might become critical.  The United States Army and 
Marine Corps used proactive thinking to develop warriors for the long term. The U.S. Air 
Force, realizing it was facing a more direct role in Iraq and Afghanistan, thought 
proactively, as well to teach its Airman fighting skills.   
The Navy lacks a combatives program because it is programmed to accept the 
past as the standard. The Navy is too multifaceted to not recognize the need for 
combatives. Once the Navy adjusts course and heads toward 21st century joint 
operational thinking, the need for combatives becomes quite clear. In order to fully 
harness a Sailor’s abilities, combatives is needed to test his or her mettle. The Navy needs 
to change its culture, embrace the warrior spirit, and recognize that combatives fits 
perfectly with the core values and the highest traditions of the Navy.    
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APPENDIX A:  A LITTLE GAME THEORY TO DRIVE THE POINT  
A. THE SITUATION 
Historically, there was insignificant need for a standardized U.S. Navy 
Combatives Program. However, the operating environment has changed. The mission of 
the Navy is changing. The current battlefield, which has typically been largely a one 
dimensional front led by the United States Army, requires a more dynamic, all 
encompassing approach. Emerging oppositions and increased military commitments on a 
global scale expanded the roles of all service members.  The most dramatic change is to 
the Navy Sailor. Servicemen, in particular, Sailors, are being assigned to nontraditional 
tasks. No longer are Sailors solely charged with duties on board warships. Multiple wars 
placed both Navy SEALS and EOD teams in the forefront of direct combat operations. 
Military augmentation plans tasked fleet Sailors on assignment to combat zones. 
Additionally, along with these duties, the United States Navy still requires Sailors to 
stand watch aboard warships, as well as maintain roving base security and shore patrol. 
These tasks all require the ability of a Sailor to defend from the opposition.    
Currently, standardized training in self-defense is not provided for the United 
States Navy. Also, the Navy has historically lacked combatives type training. Hand-to-
hand combat training for the Fleet Navy is often overlooked. Even our current SEAL 
(Sea, Air, and Land) and EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams, who share the brunt 
of frontline operations, do not receive adequate training. Additionally, the Navy has no 
proactive plans for the future in establishing a standardized program.  This type of 
thinking is the same type of thinking that did not believe in the need for joint operations 
years ago, or another example, the same type that could never envision women in 
combat, or even a Sailor in desert fatigues.  Now, there are plenty of females carrying a 
weapon, and plenty of Sailors in harm's way in the operational response areas of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Providing a Navy-wide combatives program helps develop and enhance the 
overall skills of a Sailor.  Even more important, a self-defense program provides a Sailor 
with more confidence in difficult situations.    
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So, are Sailors prepared, and what effects does a combatives program have on the 
United States Navy?  We use game theory to find the answer. 
B. THE GAME 
Figure 3 illustrates the set up of the game. A combat ready U.S. Navy Sailor is 
one that has gone through a standardized U.S. Navy Combatives Program. A non-combat 
ready Sailor is a Sailor in the Navy, who has not participated in any kind of hand-to-hand 
training. In regards to the “opposition,” the “opposition” is defined as someone that 
challenges a U.S. Navy Sailor in a hand-to-hand combat situation (whether it is an enemy 
combatant in a combat zone, or a security/law enforcement situation that requires a 
hostile individual to be detained). The two options for the opposition are to attack, or not 
to attack, depending on the situation.  
There are four possible results within this game as described below: 
AC:   U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready; opposition attacks 
AD:   U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready; opposition does not attack 
BC:   U.S. Navy Sailor is not ready for combat; opposition attacks 
BD:   U.S. Navy Sailor is not ready for combat; opposition does not attack 
 
 
Figure 3.   U.S. Navy Sailor Vs. Opposition 
 71
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
Now that the game has been defined, it is important to address the assumptions of 
the game.  Here is the list of assumptions: 
1. One U.S. Navy Sailor vs. single opposition:  To simplify, this game 
analyzes only the outcomes of a singular Sailor vs. a singular opposition. 
Multiple Sailors or multiple oppositions are not analyzed in this round of 
the game. 
2. Both U.S. Navy Sailor and opposition are playing rationally. 
3. Both U.S. Navy Sailor and opposition maximize their individual strategy.   
4. This is a hand-to-hand combat situation. All things being equal, primary 
and secondary weapons are removed from the situation, leaving a face to 
face confrontation that must be resolved using hand-to-hand combat or 
surrender.  
D. THE PAYOFFS 
We now replace the letter variables in Figure 3 with rankings, now listed in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   Payoff Projection for U.S. Navy Sailor Vs. Opposition 
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U.S. Navy Sailor Options (Best option is 4 to Worst is 1): 
4:   U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready; opposition does not attack 
3:   U.S. Navy Sailor is not ready for combat; opposition does not attack 
2:   U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready; opposition attacks 
1:   U.S. Navy Sailor is not ready for combat; opposition attacks 
Opposition Options (Best option is 4 to Worst is 1): 
4:   Opposition attacks; U.S. Navy Sailor is not ready for combat 
3:   Opposition does not attack; U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready 
2:   Opposition attacks; U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready 
1:   Opposition does not attack; U.S. Navy Sailor is not ready for combat 
Figure 5, clearly shows that the U.S. Navy Sailor indisputably has a dominant 
strategy to be combat ready. In either situation, when the opposition attacks, or does not 
attack (C, D); the U.S. Navy Sailor has a greater payoff when combat ready.  The arrows 
plainly show that the benefit of being combat ready is a better strategy than not being 
combat ready (from 1, 3 to a higher payoff of 2, 4).    
 
Figure 5.   U.S. Navy Sailor Actions 
Figure 6, shows the actions of the Opposition. Unlike the U.S. Navy Sailor, the 
Opposition does not have a dominant strategy. In both cases (C, D), the Opposition’s 
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moves are ultimately determined by the combat readiness of the U.S. Navy Sailor. The 
arrows show that the Opposition favors a non-combat ready U.S. Navy Sailor.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Opposition Actions 
Figure 7 shows a U.S. Navy Sailor vs. Opposition, and in this figure, a Nash 
Equilibrium is revealed. A Nash Equilibrium is “a set of strategies, one for each player, 
such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change her action. Players are in 
equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead that player to earn 
less than if she remained with her current strategy” (Game Theory.net, 2006). 
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Figure 7.   U.S. Navy Sailor Vs. Opposition Actions  
In summary, the Nash Equilibrium (revealed more clearly in Figure 8); clearly 
shows the U.S. Navy Sailor is better off with a combat ready stance, while the opposition 
is better off not attacking the combat ready opponent. However, as we move unto Utility 
gaming, we will see what moves to consider, and if the U.S. Navy Sailor remains 
dominant.  
 
Figure 8.   Nash Equilibrium 
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E. UTILITY GAMING 
Utility gaming gives us a better idea of what is preferred for each side. Here is a 
look at the options available: 
U.S. Navy Sailor:  
10 (Best):  U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready but does not have to fight 
opposition. 
9 (Next Best):  U.S. Navy Sailor is not combat ready and does not have to fight 
opposition. 
6 (Least Best):  U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready and has to fight opposition. 
1 (Really bad, worst):  U.S. Navy Sailor is not combat ready and has to fight 
opposition.  
Opposition: 
10 (Best):  Opposition attacks and U.S. Navy Sailor is not combat ready. 
7 (Next Best):  Opposition does not attack and the U.S. Navy Sailor is combat 
ready. 
3 (Least Best):  Opposition attacks and U.S. Navy Sailor is combat ready. 
1 (Worst):  Opposition does not attack and the U.S. Navy Sailor is not combat 
ready.  
As we analyze the options above in Utility gaming, the best options for the Sailor 
is for the opposition not to attack. A combat ready Sailor and a non-combat ready Sailor 
almost share equal attention with payoffs of 10 and 9. A payoff of 6 is given to a Sailor 
that is combat ready and has to face an opposition attack. However, this number is 
drastically higher than facing opposition that has minimal combat readiness.  
The opposition prefers the U.S. Navy Sailor to not be combat ready, giving a 10 
on the scale, for the optimal setting of attacking an untrained U.S. Navy Sailor. The 
opposition is not without intelligence, and understands the formidable task of dealing 
with a combat ready Sailor. Therefore, the opposition chooses to not fight a combat ready 
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Sailor for a ranking of 7, its next best option. Closing out the bottom options, the 
opposition would rather not choose to fight a combat ready Sailor, but prefers this option 
over not doing anything at all against a Sailor that is not combat ready.    
Figure 9 shows the best options for both U.S. Navy Sailor and the opposition. 
Similar to the previous game we played, the preferred choice for the U.S. Navy Sailor is 
to maintain combat readiness. In regards to the opposition, the best option is to wait for a 
non-combat ready opponent. This example shows an example of what is occurring with 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The opposition waits for unsuspecting U.S. servicemen 
and then move in to attack. In some situations, the opposition faces off with combat ready 
opponents, but in other situations, the opposition payoffs are maximized with non-combat 
ready troops.   
 
Figure 9.   U.S. Navy Sailor Vs. Opposition Utility Gaming 
F.  STRATEGIC MOVES 
With strategic moves, we look at the big picture of warfare.  In this model, we 
replace the values of C (Attack), and D (No Attack), with Unconventional (for C), and 
Conventional (for D). Conventional Warfare is defined as “a form of warfare between 
states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces…”  
(DOD, 2007, p. 7). With this definition of conventional warfare, we can argue that 
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unconventional warfare involves indirect methods to attain success. The argument is, 
with a large concentration of military forces, the chances of an individual engaging a 
singular enemy in a hand-to-hand combat situation is minimal. However, if outnumbered 
and outgunned, the opposition might change from a conventional style to an 
unconventional method of attack. For the purpose of this game, we argue that an 
unconventional method of an attack is to attempt to single out a soldier, or Sailor.        
In this strategic moves model, we look at the outcomes of the U.S. military 
against the opposition. Here are the assumptions: 
1. Both U.S. and opposition are equally matched. However, the U.S. is either 
combat ready or not. The opposition employs conventional tactics, or 
unconventional tactics.   
2.  Both the U.S. and opposition are playing rationally. 
3.  An unconventional attack is an attempt to single out a solider or Sailor in 
attempt to kill or kidnap them.  
4.  Combat ready, for the purpose of this model, is defined as having 
combatives training. 
Matrix Values: 
A:   U.S. is combat ready. 
B:   U.S. is not ready for combat. 
C:   Conventional Attack. 
D:   Unconventional Attack. 
Here are the new payoffs for strategic moves. 
U.S. Options (Best option is 4 to Worst is 1): 
4:   U.S. is combat ready; opposition uses conventional attack. 
3:  U.S. is combat ready; opposition uses unconventional attack. 
2:   U.S. is not combat ready; opposition uses conventional attack. 
1:   U.S. is not ready for combat; opposition uses unconventional attack. 
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Opposition Options (Best option is 4 to Worst is 1): 
4:   Opposition uses unconventional attack; U.S. is not combat ready. 
3:   Opposition uses conventional attack; U.S. is not combat ready. 
2:   Opposition uses unconventional attack; U.S. is combat ready.  
1:  Opposition uses conventional attack; U.S. is combat ready. 
Figure 10, shows a compilation of the payoff matrix with details of each move, as 
well as the location of the Nash equilibrium. In strategic moves, both sides have a 
dominant strategy. The U.S. Military has a higher payoff of a 3 in the combat ready row. 
The opposition has a higher payoff of 2 in an unconventional attack.     
 
Figure 10.   Strategic Moves Payoff Matrix 
Figure 11, shows the outcome if we play the game without communications. In 
strategic moves, without communications, both sides play conservatively. As Figure 11 
shows, the U.S. military and the opposition would reach a saddle point at AD, with a 
payoff of 3, 2.   
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Its name derives from its being the minimum of a row that is also the 
maximum of a column in a payoff matrix, which corresponds to the shape 
of a saddle. By choosing a strategy associated with this outcome, each 
player obtains an amount at least equal to his payoff at that outcome, no 
matter what the other player does. 
- Definition of “saddle point,” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2010).  
  
 
Figure 11.   U.S. Vs. Opposition, Strategic Moves, Without Communications 
This payoff might not be the optimal solutions for both players so we continue 
further to see if we can optimize payoffs. The next game is played with both sides 
communicating their intentions. In strategic moves, with communication, one side moves 
first, and then the next side moves sequentially after.   
In Figure 12, the U.S. Military moves first: 
If U.S. does A, then the opposition does D, for a payoff of 3, 2.  
If U.S. does B, then the opposition does D, for a payoff of 2, 4.  
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Figure 12.   U.S. Military Moves First 
The best option for the U.S. is to choose 3, 2. The U.S. Military has a better 
payoff in the combat ready row with a 3, instead of a 2 (which the opposition would beat 
with its 4) in the non combat ready row.  
In Figure 13, the opposition moves first: 
If the opposition does C, then the U.S. does A, for a payoff of 4, 1.  





Figure 13.   Opposition Moves First 
The best option for the opposition, if it moves first, is 3, 2.  In both situations, if 
the U.S. moves first, or if the opposition moves first, the best outcome for both players is 
3, 2. This is the same outcome without communications. Right now, the payoff remains 
the same. What if each player threatens each the other?   
In Figure 14, the U.S. military threatens, and wants D: 
If opposition plays C, the U.S. plays B, for a payoff of 1, 3. 




Figure 14.   U.S., Not a Valid Threat 
We can see that the U.S. military does not have a valid threat.  
In Figure 15, the opposition threatens, and wants B: 
If the U.S. plays A, then the opposition plays C, for a payoff of 4, 1.  
Normally, If the U.S. plays A, then the opposition plays D, for a payoff of 3, 2.  
 
Figure 15.   Opposition, Not a Valid Threat 
This threat is not valid. The U.S. improves from 3 to 4 while the opposition drops 
from a 2 to 1. Let us see what the U.S. does. 
If the U.S. plays A, then the opposition plays C, for a payoff of 4, 1. 
If the U.S. plays B, then the Opposition plays D, for a payoff of 2, 4.  
The best outcome for the U.S. is A, for a payoff of 4, 1. In summary, the threat 
does not work.  
In Figure 16, the U.S. military promise; wants C: 
If the opposition plays C, the U.S. will promise to play B, for a payoff of 1, 3.  
Normally, if the Opposition plays C, the U.S. will promise to play A, for a payoff 




Figure 16.   U.S., Not a Good Promise 
This promise helps the Opposition. Which eliminates 4, 1. However, the 
opposition will actually play this way: 
Opposition plays C, U.S. plays B, for a payoff of 1, 3. 
Opposition plays D, U.S. plays A, for a payoff of 3, 2.  
The opposition chooses a payoff of 1, 3, which is better than the without 
communications payoff, and is not a good promise for the U.S. to make.    
In Figure 17, the opposition promises, wants B: 
If the U.S. military plays B, the opposition promises to play C, for a payoff of 1, 
3.  
Normally, if the U.S. plays B, the opposition would play C, for a payoff of 2, 4. In 
this case, the promise actually hurts the U.S. so it is not consider a valid promise.  
 
 
Figure 17.   Opposition, Not a Good Promise 
To summarize the game of strategic moves, the U.S. can only benefit from being 
combat ready. In all situations, the outcome of the U.S. favors being combat ready. Of 
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course, we are dreaming to think that our attackers would communicate whether or not 
they play conventional or unconventional. This model is an example to drive the point 
across that being prepared (in this case, in combat readiness) provides a better payoff 
than not being prepared. With conservative moves, the U.S. has the advantage with the 
opposition by way of a 3, 2 outcome. However, as the game is played on, utilizing 
communication, the U.S. can still gain the advantage by moving first. The opposition 
does have one advantage, and that is if the U.S. promises. If the U.S. promises to play 
conventional, the opposition plays unconventional since that is the better payoff. 
Therefore, in this situation, the opposition should make the U.S. promise to play 
conventionally, which would lead right into the opposition’s advantage. Additionally, the 
advantage favors the opposition when it positions itself against a non-combat ready 
opponent. The strategic moves example shows an obvious picture of the need for the U.S. 
to become combat ready to gain the tactical advantage.  
G. SECURITY 
The next example, we determine each player’s security level. The U.S. and the 
opposition try to maximize their individual payoffs and minimize the opponent’s payoffs. 
The U.S. Military is listed as the blue arrows, with the opposition being the red arrows.  
In Figure 18, the opposition is more comfortable moving over to an unconventional 
attack to defeat the U.S. In Figure 19, despite the opposition using either conventional or 





Figure 18.   Opposition Security Levels 
 
 
Figure 19.   U.S. Security Levels 
Figures 18 and 19, show a consistent trend to what the U.S. faces currently with 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. is facing an enemy that finds the security in 
unconventional warfare. The only thing that determines the fate of the opposition is how 
the U.S. prepares itself for battle.    
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APPENDIX B:  LITERATURE REVIEW OF MILITARY 
COMBATIVES 
Matt Larsen (2007) discusses in his article about Army combatives that it took 
over 230 years for the Army to develop a program.  Why did it take over two centuries to 
develop a program?  The need has always been there. From the first Continental soldiers 
of the Revolutionary War, to the soldiers that stormed the city of Baghdad in 2003, the 
likelihood of hand-to-hand combat was and still is inevitable. However, in his article, he 
does not address the lack of need; instead, he addresses other outlying issues that 
constantly hindered the development of an established program. In Larsen’s words, “we 
have a comprehensive Combatives program that begins in initial military training and 
carries through to the way units are training and fighting” (2007). Combatives programs 
existed prior to the establishment of the “comprehensive program” described by Larsen, 
but they were not complete. In some cases, combatives programs were hastily put 
together, with no real methodology in teaching.  In other cases, inappropriate instructors 
were selected. For example, Larsen (2007) describes many situations where civilian 
instructors were hired to teach combat hardened soldiers. The training was not realistic to 
the realities of combat. In the end, the battle for a combatives program only led to many 
countless man hours and military dollars lost. Not to mention the lack of quality training 
that was missed out by soldiers who required it.  
Larsen’s article is a perfect lesson in what not to do, and what was done, to fix the 
issues that apparently plagued the early development of Army Combatives. Despite his 
success in creating a program, Larsen still believes in improvement for the future. He also 
sees the pitfalls that come from being too complacent in training.  This is not necessarily 
from a combat perspective but more an administrative perspective. He believes it is 
important to remain significant; otherwise the huge Army machine might erase his 
version of combatives. On this note, Larsen relies on eight principles to help guide in the 
success of the Army Combatives program he created:   
1.  Standards 
2.  Systemic Training 
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3.  Continuous Training 
4.  Competition 
5.  Drills 
6.  Live Training 
7.  Situational Training  
8.  Combat Feedback 
Marine Corps Captain, Jamison Yi, discusses the development of the Marine 
Corps Martial Arts Program in his article titled, MCMAP and the Marine Warrior Ethos 
is quoted as saying, “MCMAP’s overarching purpose is to mold and strengthen, and 
culture” (Yi, 2004, p. 20). There is a more spiritual approach to the Marine Corps method 
of hand-to-hand combat training. Yi’s article focuses more on the warrior mindset then 
the actual application of physical combat training. The hand-to-hand combat is described 
in his article, along with the basic foundations of what the MCMAP consists of, but it is 
more the exterior of what the program is really trying to teach. He argues that through 
hardened hand-to-hand combat training, a Marine develops into a better, more cultured 
individual. The brutal hand-to-hand combat training is just a vessel to transform a regular 
soldier into one of good moral and ethical qualities. In addition, the training instills 
confidence, courage and the fighting spirit that is the trademark of the Marine Corps. Yi 
(2004) describes in his article that MCMAP was developed two decades after the 
Vietnam War, following a push from the Marine Commandants of that period to establish 
a solid warrior ethos.  
Matt Larsen and Captain Yi’s article both discuss areas of importance in the 
establishment of a Self-defense Program: character and consistency. Larsen discussed the 
need for a consistent program to help develop Army soldiers. Realizing the training 
would not be perfect, Larsen believed in the benefit of consistency. Yi’s article addresses 
the character building importance of a program.  Both articles answer the question of why 
a program is important. However, the detail of developing a program is vaguely 
mentioned. Larsen (2007) mentions that the Army preferred “quick fixes” to resolve the 
 87
combatives problem. Similar to the Army Combatives, the Marine Corps long history of 
combat only saw the creation of a program in 1999. There are questions that need 
answering such as: Why did it take so long?  What obstacles were in the way?  What 
sacrifices were made to create each program?  Were there previous programs that were 
canceled prior to developing the right one?   
A similar theme occurs with Erik Holmes article about the establishment of an Air 
Force Combatives system. As Lt Col. Adelson, Deputy Chief of Education and Training 
comments, “We have always produced the smartest airmen ... ready to go out and do the 
mission ... but now we are producing warriors. The Air Force combatives is just another 
facet of that warrior production” (cited in Holmes, 2004).  The Air Force followed the 
mold laid down by Matt Larsen. In fact, Matt Larsen was asked to assist in the 
development of the Air Force program. Still a new program, the Air Force is expanding 
its program to reach all airmen. Currently, only select airmen, to include commandos, 
security personnel, and Officer Candidates receive combatives training. However, the 
curriculum is developing and the Air Force anticipates airmen wide training in the very 
near future. The only pitfall that the Air Force is facing currently is the execution and 
logistics of training all airmen.  Finally, one key quote in this article that a Sailor can 
relate to is the need for combatives training despite their lack ground fighting history. 
Holmes (2004) quotes an Air Force flight commander, “Even if they never deploy, if 
they’re somebody that just sits behind a desk, they now have more confidence and a 
slightly different attitude than what airmen of the past might have had.”  This mentality 
steals the Marine Corps playbook of warrior ethos. Many of the same questions can be 
asked from this literature:  Why did the Air Force feel there was a need for combatives?  
What obstacles were faced?    
A look back in combatives history takes us to Lieutenant Colonel Rex 
Applegate’s “Kill or Get Killed” book. An official Marine Corps Publication that is still 
relied on heavily by the Marines to this day, Kill or Get Killed was written by Applegate 
during World War II. Applegate felt the need to develop a book that not only can prepare 
soldiers in combat in foreign lands, but also ready security forces on the home front 
regarding domestic issues.   
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Two other notable combatives manuals in the early twentieth century are credited 
for establishing the groundwork for many of the current military combative systems. The 
first manual, Scientific Self-defense, was written by British soldier William Fairbairn after 
World War I. Fairbairn was a self-defense instructor for the Shanghai Municipal Police 
prior to World War II, and then instructed Allied Special Forces during World War II. 
His manual was written specifically for law enforcement officials during an era and 
location in China, where the possession of weapons was minimal, and the reliance of 
hand-to-hand combat was common. One important note to Fairbairn’s teachings, 
Lieutenant Colonel Applegate studied under William Fairbairn prior to the publishing of 
Kill or Get Killed (Kill or Get Killed, 1943, p. IX). 
 The second manual, Combato, was written by a Canadian soldier, Corporal Bill 
Underwood. Similar to Fairbairn, Underwood developed his manual to assist primarily 
law enforcement, but the techniques easily found use in the military field, specifically 
during the height of World War II. Underwood states, “The lessons which are presented 
will certainly prove sufficient in every emergency” (Underwood, 1943, p. 2). Fairbairn 
solidifies Underwood in the preface of his book by stating, “everyone should have some 
knowledge of the art of self-defense in case of emergency” (Fairbairn, 1931, p. 3). Both 
manuals laid the foundations for several military combatives programs throughout the 
world.              
Techniques developed by Fairbairn and Underwood evolved, and were refined for 
use in the modern combative arena. Both manuals recognize the need to not only teach 
soldiers an effective form of hand-to-hand combat in a life or death situation, but also law 
enforcement officials in the art of restraint and control when dealing with hostile 
civilians.          
In World War II, Lieutenant Junior Grade Wesley Brown developed a manual to 
teach Navy pilots the art of hand-to-hand combat. Brown was a self-defense instructor 
tasked with preparing pilots.  Titled the U.S. Navy Aviation Hand-to-hand Combat 
Manual, informally known as the “V-Five Program,” the techniques are similar to 
Fairbairn, Underwood, and Applegate’s manuals. In the manual, Brown recognizes the 
critical need for hand-to-hand combat training. Also similar to other manuals, the manual 
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varies in degrees of self-defense techniques from life threatening situations, to subduing 
an attacker. This manual is one of the only examples of the Navy’s attempt to having a 
consistent combatives program. In 1951, Lieutenant Commander Brown refined the 
techniques he devised with the V-Five Program and printed a book titled, “Self-defense.”  
Written during peacetime, Self-defense’s intent was to maintain hand-to-hand combat 
skills previously learned in World War II. 
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